

Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols

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We formalize the Dolev–Yao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the Dolev–Yao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a DEXP-complete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an NP-complete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.

1. Introduction

Protocols based on cryptographic primitives are commonly used to protect access to computer systems and to protect transactions over the Internet. Two well-known examples are the Kerberos authentication scheme [43,44], used to manage encrypted passwords on clusters of interconnected computers, and the Secure Sockets Layer [31], used by internet browsers and servers to carry out secure internet transactions.

Security protocol design and analysis is a difficult problem. Some of the difficulties come from subtleties of cryptographic primitives. Further difficulties arise because security protocols are required to work properly when multiple instances of the protocol are carried out in parallel, where a malicious intruder may combine data from separate sessions in order to confuse honest participants. Moreover, although the protocols themselves are often very simple, the security properties they are supposed to achieve are rather subtle and should be formulated with great care. Many security protocols have been published with subtle flaws that may be

traced to insufficient rigor in formulating the premises about capabilities of participants.

In the literature on security protocol design and analysis, protocols are commonly described using an informal notation that leaves many properties of a protocol unspecified. For example, a short challenge-response section of a protocol might be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} A &\longrightarrow B : \{n\}_K \\ B &\longrightarrow A : \{f(n)\}_K \end{aligned}$$

In this notation, a message of the form $\{x\}_y$ consists of a plaintext x encrypted with key y . In this example protocol, Alice chooses a random number n and sends its encryption to Bob. There is no specific indication of how Bob determines what to send in response, but we can see that Bob returns a message that contains the encryption of $f(n)$. By analogy with familiar protocols, we might assume that he decrypts the message he receives to determine n , then applies f to n and returns the result to Alice (encrypted with the same key).

As written, the protocol description only gives an intended trace or family of traces involving the honest principals. There is no standard way of determining the initial conditions or assumptions about shared information, nor can we see how the principals will respond to messages that differ from those explicitly written. For example, in the case at hand, we must explain in English that K is assumed to be a shared key and that n is generated by Alice. Otherwise, it is a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the two lines above that Alice and Bob initially share a number n . In this case, Alice might send $\{n\}_K$ to Bob, with Bob returning $\{f(n)\}_K$ to Alice only if he receives precisely $\{n\}_K$. While the two readings of the protocol give the same sequence of messages when no one interferes with network transmission, the effects are different if an intruder intercepts the message from Alice to Bob and replaces it with another message. Hence it seems fair to say that the notation commonly found in the literature does not provide a rigorous basis for security protocol analysis.

In recent years, a variety of methods have been developed for analyzing and reasoning about security protocols. These approaches include specialized logics such as BAN logic [7], special-purpose tools designed for cryptographic protocol analysis [41], as well as theorem-proving [55,56] and model-checking methods using general purpose tools [19,45,50,53,59,61,62].

Although there are many differences among these approaches, most current formal approaches use the same basic model of adversary capabilities, which appears to have developed from positions taken by Needham and Schroeder [54] and a model presented by Dolev and Yao [25]. In this idealized setting, a protocol adversary is allowed to nondeterministically choose among possible actions. Messages are composed of indivisible abstract values, not sequences of bits, and encryption is modeled in an idealized way. The adversary may only send messages comprised of data it “knows” as the result of overhearing past transmissions.

The Dolev–Yao abstraction makes symbolic reasoning about cryptographic protocols a viable approach. Perhaps the simplest approach in this regard is to consider protocols as a form of rewriting, so that protocol execution could be carried out symbolically. This observation was sharpened to a rigorous, formal definition of the Dolev–Yao model by means of multiset rewriting with existential quantification, MSR, introduced in [14,27,52]. In addition to rewriting to effect state transitions, we also needed a way to choose new values, such as nonces or keys. While this seems difficult to achieve directly in standard rewriting formalisms, the proof rules associated with existential quantification appear to be just what is required. Therefore, we have adopted a notation that may be regarded as an extension of multiset rewriting (see, e.g., [5,6]) with existential quantification. This formalism is quite palatable and quite close to the informal, traditional way of describing protocol message exchange, described above. Since its inception in [14,27], the MSR formalism has been applied and extended in several ways. MSR has been incorporated into a high-level specification language for authentication protocols, CAPSL [24]. A typed version of MSR is studied in [12]. MSR has been successfully applied in the analysis of widely used protocols such as Kerberos 5 [8]. MSR is used as a formal setting for a game-based analysis of contract-signing protocols in [58].

The importance of existential quantification, for security protocols, is that it provides a direct mechanism for choosing a new value that is different from other values used in the execution of a system. Since many protocols involve choosing fresh nonces, fresh encryption keys, and so on, existential quantification seems like a useful primitive for describing security protocols. While existential quantification does not semantically imply there exist “new” values with certain properties, standard proof rules for manipulating existential quantifiers require introduction of fresh symbols (sometimes called Skolem constants). The way that existential quantification is used in our formalism is based on the standard existential elimination rule from natural deduction. If we have an existentially quantified axiom, $\exists x.\phi$, then this rule says that if we wish to prove some formula ψ , we can choose a new symbol y for the “ x that is presumed to exist” and proceed to derive ψ from $[y/x]\phi$. The side condition “ y not free in any other hypothesis in the proof of ψ ” means that the only hypothesis in the proof of ψ that can contain y is the hypothesis $[y/x]\phi$.

Our multiset rewriting framework with existential quantification (MSR) may also be viewed as the existential Horn fragment of first-order linear logic [34]. The close connection between standard multiset rewriting (without existential quantification) and simple fragments of linear logic has been studied extensively [4,33,39,47] and extended in [13] to include parameters and existential quantification. Under this correspondence, every MSR transition sequence corresponds to a linear logic derivation in normal form, and conversely.

A linear logical framework automated tool *LLF* [16] may be used to simulate the execution of protocols, detect attacks, and construct formal proofs about protocol transformations [14]. A similar fragment of linear logic is used in [40] as a basis for a specification language for real-time systems. Linear logic is also used to model

the state-transition aspect of protocols, but not existential quantification for nonces, in [21,23].

As presented in [14,27], a protocol theory consists of three parts: a bounded phase describing protocol initialization that distributes keys or establishes other shared information, a role generation theory that designates possibly multiple roles that each principal may play in a protocol (such as initiator, responder, client, or server), and a disjoint union of bounded subtheories that each characterize a possible role. Encryption is typed, which prevents arbitrarily nested encryption terms. These syntactic restrictions, which are discussed in detail in the first part of the present paper, make it possible to distinguish, in precise terms, protocols from general rewrite systems. This particular feature of the MSR formalism is a novel contribution to security protocol analysis; it seems to have no counterpart in the richer formalisms such as [1]. Furthermore, this feature of the MSR formalism allows us to identify two important parameters of a protocol itself: the number of roles and the number of new data (such as nonces or keys) introduced by the protocol.

Using our precise form of protocol theory, in the second part of the paper we discuss in detail several decidability and complexity results regarding the secrecy property for protocols, most of which were established in [14,27]. Informally, a protocol satisfies secrecy if some privileged information (fixed in advance) will never be released to the adversary. In MSR this property may be stated as *unreachability*: global configuration in which the intruder is in possession of the specified secret is not reachable by protocol execution steps. Hence the failure of secrecy is stated as *reachability*. We show that secrecy is an undecidable property even if data constructors, message depth, message width, number of distinct roles, role length, and depth of encryption are bounded by constants. DEXPTIME-completeness of the failure of secrecy is shown for protocols further restricted to allow only a fixed number of new data. Furthermore, NP-completeness of the failure of secrecy is shown for protocols restricted even further to have a fixed number of roles. The latter upper bound has been recently strengthened considerably, namely that it is in NP without any bound on message size, in [3,60].

In some ways, undecidability might not be expected for protocols. The reason is that there is only a finite number of possible messages, except for the unbounded number of new nonces that repeated runs of a protocol might generate. However, our undecidability proof shows that nonces may be used as a form of “pointer”, linking together messages that contain only simple data. However innocuous they may seem, nonces are at the heart of the problem in analyzing this class of security protocols. In the undecidability proof, the intruder stores encryptions of all atomic formulas derivable from a given existential Horn theory without function symbols, replaying these messages as needed in order for the protocol steps to carry out an arbitrary deduction. The undecidability of the implication problem for existential Horn clauses without function symbols follows from [17] and may also be obtained directly by axiomatizing a Cook’s-theorem-style Turing machine tableau [26]. If protocols are further

restricted to generate no new data during execution, then DEXPTIME-hardness follows by the same encoding of Horn formulas (Datalog programs) as in our undecidability proof, applied to Horn clauses without function symbols and without existential quantification. For these Horn theories, DEXPTIME-hardness of the implication problem (measured as a function of the size of the theory) is implicit in [38,65], as explained in [22].

Multiset rewriting formalism (MSR) is presented in Section 2 by means of several increasingly complex examples. In Section 3 we show how to represent security protocol theories in MSR, introducing the modeling of nonces, roles, the intruder, and encryption. A detailed example of the Needham–Schroeder Public Key Protocol in MSR is in Section 4. In Section 5 we show complexity results for security protocols under various restrictions. In Section 6 we show some examples of protocols that demonstrate some of the lower bounds in a more practical setting. In Section 7 we discuss related work, and finally in Section 8 we present conclusions.

2. Multiset rewriting with existential quantification

2.1. Protocol notation

We introduce a formalism for describing a class of nondeterministic infinite-state systems. The formalism is similar in many respects to standard rewrite systems [42,51], with two main differences. The first is that instead of representing information by a single expression, we use multisets of first-order atomic formulas. (A multiset is similar to a set, but with counting of duplicates.) The second main difference is that the formalism has a basic mechanism for choosing “new” symbols. This is important for modeling protocols that choose a new nonce or generate encryption keys.

Our formalism can also be viewed as a Horn fragment of linear logic [4,9,32,34,39,46]. A similar fragment of linear logic is used in [40] to represent real-time finite-state systems. Two other efforts using linear logic to model the state-transition aspect of protocols (but not existential quantification for nonces) are [21,23].

The multiset rewriting notation is also related to the Chemical Abstract Machine formalism [6], with the primary difference being the addition of existentials.

The syntax involves terms, facts and rules. If we want to represent a system in this formalism, we begin by choosing a vocabulary, or *first-order signature*. This is a standard notion from multi-sorted first-order logic [28].

Signatures. A first-order signature consist of a set of sorts, together with function symbols and predicate symbols with specific sorts. The sorts indicate the kinds of data that will be used in the model. For example, the sorts used in a protocol may be

key, **msg**, **nonce** for encryption keys, message contents and nonces. Function symbols are names for functions on the sorts of the signature. For example, an encryption function might have sort

$$\text{encrypt} : \text{key} \times \text{msg} \rightarrow \text{cipher}$$

where **cipher** is the sort for ciphertexts (encrypted text). In any signature, each function symbol must have a fixed set of parameter sorts (one for each function argument) and a result sort. A function with no arguments is called a *constant symbol*. Finally, a multi-sorted first-order signature has a set of predicate symbols, each with a fixed set of parameter sorts. It's also possible to consider order-sorted signatures [35] and in fact we will find this convenient for specifying some example protocol theories in our formalism in Section 3.

Terms. The terms over a signature are the set of expressions formed by applying functions to arguments. In each case, a function must be applied to arguments of the correct sort. For example, if $f : s \rightarrow t$ and $x : s$, then $f(x)$ is a well-formed term since the argument sort of f matches the sort of x . As suggested by this example, terms may contain variables, but each variable must have an associated sort. A variable is not allowed to be used with different sorts in different expressions associated with the same system. (All of this can be formalized using an inductive definition of the well-formed terms and their sorts, but we assume that most readers will be familiar with these standard concepts from logic.)

Facts. A *fact* is a ground (i.e., variable-free) first-order atomic formula. This means that a fact is the result of applying a predicate symbol to ground terms of the correct sorts.

States. A *state* is a multiset of facts (all over the same signature). In this paper we are only concerned with finite multisets.

Rules. State transitions are written using two multisets of atomic formulas, in the following syntactic form:

$$F_1, \dots, F_k \longrightarrow \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_j. G_1, \dots, G_n$$

The meaning of this rule is that if state S contains facts $\sigma F_1, \dots, \sigma F_k$ for some ground substitution σ , then one possible next state is the state S' that is similar to S , but with:

- facts $\sigma F_1, \dots, \sigma F_k$ removed,
- $\sigma G_1, \dots, \sigma G_n$ added, where substitution σ replaces $x_1 \dots x_j$ by new constant symbols.

While existential quantification does not semantically imply there exist “new” values with certain properties, standard proof rules for manipulating existential quantifiers require introduction of fresh symbols (sometimes called Skolem constants), as described in Section 2.3.

If there are free variables in the rule $F_1, \dots, F_k \longrightarrow \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_j. G_1, \dots, G_n$, these are treated as universally quantified. In an application of a rule, these free variables may be replaced by any terms.

For example, consider the state

$$S = \{P(f(a)), P(b)\}$$

and rule

$$P(x) \longrightarrow P(f(x)).$$

Then one possible next state is obtained by using the substitution $\sigma = [x \mapsto f(a)]$, instantiating the rule to

$$P(f(a)) \longrightarrow P(f(f(a))).$$

With this substitution, we can remove $P(f(a))$ from S and obtain the next state $S' = \{P(f(f(a))), P(b)\}$.

We can then use a different instance of the rule, with substitution $\sigma' = [x \mapsto b]$,

$$P(b) \longrightarrow P(f(b))$$

to reach state $S'' = \{P(f(f(a))), P(f(b))\}$. It is also possible to reach S'' from S by performing these replacements in the opposite order.

If a function is invertible, then this can also be expressed as a rule. For example, the rule

$$P(f(x)) \longrightarrow Q(x)$$

involves recovering the data x from $f(x)$. We will use rules of this form to describe decryption of encrypted messages.

An *MSR Theory* is defined by a signature and a set of rules. Given an MSR Theory and a state there is a set of *traces*, with each state reached from the previous one by applying one of the rules from the theory.

2.2. Example: finite automata

As a first example, without existential quantification, we describe a method for presenting finite-state automata in this notation. Assuming we have some specific automaton A , we choose a vocabulary for describing the input tape and the states of the automaton, and we have a rule corresponding to each state transition of the automaton. Each rule consumes an input and moves to the next state. The rules will depend on the specific automaton A , but the basic method can be applied to any automaton.

Sorts. Given an automaton A , the signature for the theory $Th(A)$ has three sorts: **st** for automaton states, **symb** for input symbols and **string** for lists of input symbols.

Predicates. We use predicates to represent the automaton state, and its current input string.

State : st current state
Input : string current input string

Functions. We use the **cons** function to represent concatenation of strings,

cons : symb \times string \rightarrow string

For simplicity, we will write $a \cdot x$ for **cons**(a, x).

Constants. We need names for the states of automaton A , and names for the symbols of the input alphabet, as well as a name for the empty string.

q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots : st finite set of states
 a, b : symb input alphabet
nil : string empty string

Rules. There is one rule for each state transition of A . For example, here are some rules describing possible transitions between states q_0 and q_1 :

State(q_0), Input($a \cdot x$) \longrightarrow State(q_1), Input(x)
State(q_0), Input($b \cdot x$) \longrightarrow State(q_2), Input(x)
State(q_1), Input($a \cdot x$) \longrightarrow State(q_3), Input(x)
State(q_1), Input($b \cdot x$) \longrightarrow State(q_0), Input(x)

A sample derivation gives us automata state transitions from q_0 to q_1 and back on input $a \cdot b \cdot \text{nil}$. We will write this out as a sequence of states, starting with the multiset $\{\text{State}(q_0), \text{Input}(a \cdot b \cdot \text{nil})\}$ that represents the automaton in state q_0 with input string $a \cdot b \cdot \text{nil}$.

$\{\text{State}(q_0), \text{Input}(a \cdot b \cdot \text{nil})\} \longrightarrow \{\text{State}(q_1), \text{Input}(b \cdot \text{nil})\}$
 $\longrightarrow \{\text{State}(q_0), \text{Input}(\text{nil})\}$

It should be easy to see that if we begin with a system state consisting of one fact about the state of the automaton, and one fact about the input string, then we can only reach other system states of this form. In particular, we can never reach a system state where the automaton is in two states.

2.3. Existential quantification

It is possible to give finite descriptions of infinite-state systems using function symbols. For example, if we have $\mathbf{0} : \mathbf{nat}$ and $\mathbf{suc} : \mathbf{nat} \rightarrow \mathbf{nat}$, then we can write expressions for arbitrarily many natural numbers. If each system state has a natural number, then we will have infinitely many possible system states.

Existential quantification provides an alternate way of expressing infinitely many possible states. As we will see in Section 3, the importance of existential quantification, for security protocols, is that it provides a direct mechanism for choosing a new value that is different from other values used in the execution of a system. Since many protocols involve choosing fresh nonces, fresh encryption keys, and so on, existential quantification seems like a useful primitive for describing security protocols.

The way that existential quantification is used in our formalism is based on the existential elimination rule from natural deduction. This proof rule is commonly written as follows.

$$(\exists \text{ elim}) \quad \frac{
 \begin{array}{c}
 [c/x]\phi \\
 \vdots \\
 \exists x.\phi \quad \psi
 \end{array}
 \quad c \text{ does not occur in any}
 }{
 \psi \quad \text{other hypothesis}
 }$$

If we have an existentially quantified axiom, $\exists x.\phi$, then this rule says that if we wish to prove some formula ψ , we can choose a new constant symbol c for the “ x that is presumed to exist” and proceed to derive ψ from $[c/x]\phi$. The side condition “ c does not occur in any other hypothesis in the proof of ψ ” means that the only hypothesis in the proof of ψ that can contain c is the hypothesis $[c/x]\phi$.

2.4. Example: Turing machine

We can see how existential quantification allows us to describe infinite-state systems by axiomatizing a Turing machine. This construction shows that MSR theories with existentials are undecidable. Later (in Appendix 8), we will use other encodings of Turing machines to prove the undecidability and complexity lower bounds for security protocols in the presence of an attacker. Because of the attacker and the details of the protocols, the encoding used in those examples will be different.

Let us assume we have some specific Turing machine M . We choose a vocabulary for describing states of the machine and its input, and write rules to describe transitions according to machine state and input. The rules will depend on the specific machine M , but the basic method can be applied to any Turing machine.

Sorts. The signature for this theory has three sorts: **state** for the Turing machines states, **cell** for the cell names, and **symbol** for the cell contents.

Predicates. The first predicate used in this example is used to describe the current machine state and tape position. The other two predicates describe the contents of a tape cell and the order (adjacency) between cells.

$\text{Curr} : \text{state} \times \text{cell}$ current state, tape pos.
 $\text{Cont} : \text{cell} \times \text{symbol}$ contents of cell is symbol
 $\text{Adj} : \text{cell} \times \text{cell}$ keep cells in order

Constants. We also need names for the states of the machine M , names for the cells at the beginning and end of the tape, and names for the symbols that may appear on the tape (0, 1, and blank). The reason we have an end-of-tape cell, c_{eot} , is that we will represent an unbounded tape by including rules that will allow us to allocate as many tape cells as needed. In other words, we will represent the Turing machine tape by explicitly constructing the finite list of cells that the machine has looked at, one at a time.

$q_0, q_1, q_2, \dots : \text{state}$ finite set of states
 $c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{\text{eot}} : \text{cell}$ initial tape cells
 $0, 1, \square : \text{symbol}$ tape symbols

Rules. There are three classes of transition rules: tape maintenance rules, transition rules that correspond to Turing machine moves that move the head to the right, and transition rules that correspond to moving the head left. Initially, we will start the machine with two tape cells, the leftmost cell c_0 and the rightmost end-of-tape cell c_{eot} . This is expressed by the fact

$$\text{Adj}(c_0, c_{\text{eot}})$$

At any step in the computation, we can apply the tape maintenance rule

$$\text{Adj}(c, c_{\text{eot}}) \longrightarrow \exists c'. \text{Adj}(c, c'), \text{Cont}(c', \square), \text{Adj}(c', c_{\text{eot}})$$

Informally, this rule “says” that if cell c is adjacent to the end-of-tape cell, then we can allocate a new cell c' and place c' between c and the end-of-tape cell. The new cell will be blank. An example computation below shows how this rule can be used.

The rules for the actual moves of the Turing machine will depend on the structure of the specific machine M we wish to represent. Suppose that Turing machine M moves to the right, if it is in state q_i with symbol 0 on the tape cell currently under the tape head. If the move of M , in this case, is to state q_j , writing 1 into the tape cell, we will have a rule of the following form:

$$\text{Curr}(q_i, c), \text{Cont}(c, 0), \text{Adj}(c, c') \longrightarrow \text{Curr}(q_j, c'), \text{Cont}(c, 1), \text{Adj}(c, c')$$

If, instead of moving right, the machine would move left in this case, we would instead have the transition rule

$$\text{Curr}(q_i, c), \text{Cont}(c, \mathbf{0}), \text{Adj}(c', c) \longrightarrow \text{Curr}(q_j, c'), \text{Cont}(c, \mathbf{1}), \text{Adj}(c', c)$$

Note that moving to the right, we assume that there is a tape cell to the right of the tape head. This assumption can be satisfied by using the tape maintenance rule if needed before executing this Turing machine move.

Sample computation. Although the exact moves will depend on the specific Turing machine that is represented by this method, we can illustrate the use of existential quantification by showing some example moves of a sample machine. Let us consider a Turing machine that reads the input tape until two consecutive $\mathbf{0}$'s are read, then inserts a $\mathbf{1}$ after the both of them and moves to the left over the second $\mathbf{0}$. Suppose that the machine starts in state q_0 and remains in this state until it reaches a cell containing $\mathbf{0}$. At that point, the machine changes to state q_1 to “remember that it has seen a $\mathbf{0}$ ” and moves right. Then the first few moves of the machine on input $\mathbf{100}$ might appear as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Curr}(q_0, c_0), \text{Cont}(c_0, \mathbf{1}), \text{Cont}(c_1, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_2, \mathbf{0}), \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \text{Adj}(c_2, c_{\text{eot}}) \\ \longrightarrow & \text{Curr}(q_0, c_1), \text{Cont}(c_0, \mathbf{1}), \text{Cont}(c_1, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_2, \mathbf{0}), \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \text{Adj}(c_2, c_{\text{eot}}) \\ \longrightarrow & \text{Curr}(q_1, c_2), \text{Cont}(c_0, \mathbf{1}), \text{Cont}(c_1, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_2, \mathbf{0}), \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \text{Adj}(c_2, c_{\text{eot}}) \end{aligned}$$

At this point, the appropriate transition will be a move to the right on to the next cell, where the machine will write a $\mathbf{1}$. However, this would place the tape head over the special “end-of-tape” marker. Since we would like the machine to proceed as if the tape were infinite, we must use the tape maintenance rule

$$\text{Adj}(c, c_{\text{eot}}) \longrightarrow \exists c'. \text{Adj}(c, c'), \text{Cont}(c', \square), \text{Adj}(c', c_{\text{eot}})$$

to insert a new cell in front of the end-of-tape cell. This gives us the transition

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Curr}(q_1, c_2), \text{Cont}(c_0, \mathbf{1}), \text{Cont}(c_1, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_2, \mathbf{0}), \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \text{Adj}(c_2, c_{\text{eot}}) \\ \longrightarrow & \text{Curr}(q_1, c_2), \text{Cont}(c_0, \mathbf{1}), \text{Cont}(c_1, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_2, \mathbf{0}), \text{Cont}(c_3, \square), \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \text{Adj}(c_2, c_3), \text{Adj}(c_3, c_{\text{eot}}) \end{aligned}$$

which inserts a new blank cell, c_3 in front of the end-of-tape marker. Then the machine head may be moved right over the new blank square and write a $\mathbf{1}$. Although it would be possible to apply a transition rule moving the machine head over the end-of-tape marker, the end-of-tape marker has no contents. Since each machine move

requires a tape cell with some contents (possibly including the blank \square), a derivation that places the Turing machine head over the end-of-tape marker will “hang” the machine and have no effect on the set of accepting computations.

In this example we have used existential quantification to avoid the unbounded use of function applications. It would be possible to implement a Turing machine without existentials by using skolem functions.

2.5. Creation, consumption, persistence

Some preliminary definitions involve the ways that a fact may be created, preserved, or consumed by a rule. While multiple copies of some facts may be needed in some derivations, we are able to eliminate the need for multiple copies of certain facts.

Definition 2.1. Assume \mathcal{T} is a theory and P is a predicate. Any rule has the form $l \longrightarrow r$, where l is the facts F_1, \dots, F_k on the left hand side, and r is the facts G_1, \dots, G_n , possibly with one or more existential quantifiers, on the right hand side. A rule in a theory \mathcal{T} *creates* P facts if some $P(\vec{t})$ occurs more times in r than in l . A rule in a theory \mathcal{T} *preserves* P facts if every $P(\vec{t})$ occurs the same number of times in r and l . A rule in a theory \mathcal{T} *consumes* P facts if some fact $P(\vec{t})$ occurs more times in l than in r . A predicate P in a theory \mathcal{T} is *persistent* if every rule in \mathcal{T} which contains P either creates or preserves P facts.

As an example, a rule of form

$$Q(\vec{x}) \longrightarrow Q(\vec{y})$$

does not preserve Q facts, since it can be used to create a fact $Q(\vec{t})$ and consume a fact $Q(\vec{s})$.

Since a persistent fact is never consumed by any rule, there is no need to generate more than one copy of a particular fact – as long as that fact is never needed more than once by a single rule. However, by simple transformation, it is possible to eliminate the need for more than one copy of any persistent fact.

For example, a rule of form:

$$P(\vec{x}), P(\vec{y}), \dots \longrightarrow Q(\vec{x}, \vec{y}), P(\vec{x}), P(\vec{y}), \dots$$

(with P a persistent predicate) can be replaced by rules of form:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\vec{x}) &\longrightarrow P_1(\vec{x}), P(\vec{x}) \\ P(\vec{x}) &\longrightarrow P_2(\vec{x}), P(\vec{x}) \\ P_1(\vec{x}), P_2(\vec{y}), \dots &\longrightarrow Q(\vec{x}, \vec{y}), P_1(\vec{x}), P_2(\vec{y}), \dots \end{aligned}$$

(where P_1 and P_2 are persistent predicates).

Definition 2.2. A rule $l \longrightarrow r$ in a theory \mathcal{T} is a *single-persistent rule* if all predicates that are persistent in theory \mathcal{T} appear at most once in l . A theory \mathcal{T} is a *uniform theory* if all rules in \mathcal{T} are single-persistent rules.

Since any theory can be rewritten as a uniform theory, we will assume that all theories discussed from this point forward are uniform theories.

Definition 2.3. Let \mathbf{P} be a set of predicates, each persistent in a uniform theory \mathcal{T} . Two states S and S' are *P-similar* (denoted $S \simeq_P S'$) if, after removing all duplicate persistent P facts from each state, they are equal multisets.

Lemma 2.4. If $S \simeq_P S'$ and $S \xrightarrow{\mathcal{T}} T$, then $\exists T'. T \simeq_P T'$ with $S' \xrightarrow{\mathcal{T}} T'$.

Proof. We construct the derivation $S' \xrightarrow{\mathcal{T}} T'$ as follows: We use the same rules and substitutions as the derivation $S \xrightarrow{\mathcal{T}} T$. This derivation is valid because all rules are single-persistent, so any rules and substitution used in the original derivation will also work in the second derivation (all necessary facts are available to enable the rules). \square

2.6. Equality and disequality

The basic MSR framework defined in Section 2.1 can be extended with tests for disequality of terms using \neq conditions in rules. In the extension MSR_{\neq} , which we consider briefly in Section 5, these conditions are allowed only on the left hand sides of rules, and are not considered to be facts.

We illustrate this by example. Given a rule of form

$$P_1(t_1, t_2, \dots), P_2(u_1, u_2, \dots), t_2 \neq u_2 \longrightarrow Q_1(\dots), Q_2(\dots)$$

If a state S has facts P_1 and P_2 for terms t_1, t_2, \dots and u_1, u_2, \dots where t_2 is different from u_2 , then a possible next state is S' with facts P_1 and P_2 replaced by facts Q_1 and Q_2 .

To summarize, MSR_{\neq} is the extension of MSR with these extended rules, keeping the same signature, terms and facts as defined in Section 2.1.

We do not need to add a condition to test for equality, because it is expressible by matching the names of the variables in the terms. For example, the set of facts $\{P(a, b, c), Q(a, d, e)\}$ matches the left hand side of the rule

$$P(x, y, z), Q(x, v, w), y \neq v \longrightarrow R(\dots), S(\dots)$$

While the set $\{P(a, b, c), Q(a, b, e)\}$ does not. The rule requires that the first two arguments of the facts for predicates P and Q be the same, and the second two arguments be different.

Computationally, the meaning of \exists in MSR_{\neq} is clear – each value generated by an \exists is unequal to all others. We have not investigated the correspondence between logic and MSR_{\neq} .

3. Multiset rewriting for protocol theories

In this section we will explain the form of an MSR theory for a class of security protocols that use Public Key encryption. We will make an incremental presentation, starting with some simple protocol roles, then introducing the Dolev–Yao intruder model and our encryption model, and finally defining the requirements for a two-phase intruder theory. An example of a full theory for a public key protocol is presented in Section 4.

Needham–Schroeder Public Key Protocol. We will use the Needham–Schroeder Public Key protocol [54] as a running example throughout this paper. The complete core protocol, which omits the steps that use a trusted server to distribute the public keys, is shown in Table 1, using a common informal notation.

In the first step, the initiator A (commonly referred to as “Alice”) sends a message to the responder B (commonly referred to as “Bob”). The message contains Alice’s name, and a freshly chosen nonce, n_a (typically a large random number). The message is encrypted with Bob’s public key, which means only somebody with Bob’s private key can decrypt it and understand its contents.

In the second step, Bob replies with a nonce of his own, n_b , along with Alice’s nonce, both encrypted with Alice’s public key.

In the final step, Alice replies by returning Bob’s nonce, encrypted with his public key.

3.1. Protocol theories

During a network transaction involving an implemented security protocol, several activities take place, possibly simultaneously. These include key generation, key distribution, and initiation of a protocol session by a specific participant. These activities can be arbitrarily interleaved. For example, some public key protocol sessions can take place between Alice and Bob, and then later a new participant Carol might join them by obtaining a public key certificate so that she can also converse with Alice and Bob in future sessions.

Table 1
Needham–Schroeder Public Key protocol

A	\longrightarrow	B	:	$\{A, n_a\}_{K_b}$
B	\longrightarrow	A	:	$\{n_a, n_b\}_{K_a}$
A	\longrightarrow	B	:	$\{n_b\}_{K_b}$

Here we introduce the notion of a protocol *role* – specific steps of the protocol meant to be carried out by a single principal. These are referred to as *local protocols* by Woo and Lam [66]. A typical protocol includes at least an initiator and a responder role, and often includes a trusted third party or a server. Protocol analysis concerns the interaction of an arbitrary number of instances of arbitrary assignments of principals to roles, in the presence of an intruder who can replay messages and parts of messages (i.e., a Dolev–Yao intruder).

In our model we separate the protocol execution into stages. There is an implicit or explicit initialization phase that distributes keys or establishes other shared information. Following this initialization phase, each agent may choose to carry out the protocol any number of times, in any combination of roles. For example a principal A may play the role of initiator twice, and responder once, during the course of a single attack. We incorporate these ideas into our formal definitions by letting a protocol theory consist of an initialization theory, a role generation theory, and the disjoint union of bounded subtheories that each characterize a possible role. We identify the syntactic form of a class of *well-founded protocol theories*.

It is relatively straightforward to use the multiset rewriting framework summarized in the preceding section to describe finite-state and infinite-state systems. Using function symbols, it is possible to describe computation over unbounded data types. In particular, it is easy to encode counter machines or Turing machines (as we did in Section 2.4), implying that secrecy is undecidable. However, the principal authentication and secrecy protocols of interest are all of bounded length, and most use data of bounded complexity (see [18] for a relevant survey). So, it seems reasonable for our model to represent protocols in a way that reflects their bounded nature. Thus we assume that the initialization steps are bounded, and that initialization can be completed prior to the execution of the protocol steps proper. We also formally define protocol role theories as *bounded role theories*.

Definition 3.1. A rule $R = l \longrightarrow r$ enables a rule $l' \longrightarrow r'$ if there exist substitutions σ, σ' such that some fact $P(\vec{t}) \in \sigma r$, is also in $\sigma' l'$. A theory \mathcal{T} precedes a theory \mathcal{S} if no rule in \mathcal{S} enables a rule in \mathcal{T} .

Intuitively, if a theory \mathcal{T} precedes a theory \mathcal{S} , then no facts that appear in the left hand side of rules in \mathcal{T} are created by rules that are in \mathcal{S} .

Definition 3.2. A theory \mathcal{A} is a *bounded role theory* if there is a finite list of predicates called the *role states* and written S_0, S_1, \dots, S_k for some k , such that for each rule $l \longrightarrow r$ there is exactly one occurrence of a state predicate in l , say S_i , and there is exactly one occurrence of a state predicate in r , say S_j . Furthermore, it must be the case that $i < j$. We call the first role state, S_0 , an *initial role state*.

By defining roles in this way, we ensure that each application of a rule in \mathcal{A} advances the state forward. Each instance of a role can only result in a finite number of steps in the derivation.

Definition 3.3. If $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_k$ is a set of bounded role theories, a *role generation theory* is a set of rules of the form

$$P(\vec{s}), Q(\vec{t}), \dots \longrightarrow S_i(\vec{r}), P(\vec{s}), Q(\vec{t}), \dots$$

where $P(\vec{s}), Q(\vec{t}), \dots$ is a finite list of persistent facts not involving any role states, and S_i is the initial role state for one of $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_k$.

Definition 3.4. A theory $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathcal{T}$ is a *bounded sub-theory* of \mathcal{T} if all formulas on the right hand side of the rules R in \mathcal{S} either contain existentials or are persistent in \mathcal{T} .

Definition 3.5. A theory \mathcal{P} is a *well-founded protocol theory* if $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{R} \uplus \mathcal{A}_1 \uplus \dots \uplus \mathcal{A}_n$ where \mathcal{I} is a bounded sub-theory (called the *initialization theory*) not involving any role states, \mathcal{R} is a role generation theory involving only facts created by \mathcal{I} and the initial roles states of $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$, and $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$ are bounded role theories, with \mathcal{I} preceding \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R} preceding $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_n$. For role theories \mathcal{A}_i and \mathcal{A}_j , with $i \neq j$, no role state predicate that occurs in \mathcal{A}_i can occur in \mathcal{A}_j , and vice-versa.

This form allows derivations in a protocol theory to be broken down into three stages – the initialization stage, the role generation stage, and the protocol execution stage. Tables 5 and 6 show examples of these theories for the Needham–Schroeder Protocol.

Lemma 3.6. *Given a well-founded protocol theory $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{R} \uplus \mathbf{A}$, where \mathcal{I} is an initialization theory, \mathcal{R} is a role generation theory, and \mathbf{A} is the union of one or more bounded role theories, if $S \xrightarrow{\mathcal{P}} T$ is a derivation over \mathcal{P} , then there exists a derivation $S \xrightarrow{\mathcal{I}} S'$, $S' \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}} S''$ and $S'' \xrightarrow{\mathbf{A}} T$, where all rules from \mathcal{I} are applied before any rules from \mathcal{R} , and all rules from \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{R} are applied before any rules from \mathbf{A} .*

Proof. Since \mathcal{P} is a well-founded protocol theory, we know that \mathcal{I} precedes \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{R} precede all of the theories in \mathbf{A} . Since no rules in \mathcal{R} can enable rules in \mathcal{I} , all rules in \mathcal{I} can be applied before any rules in \mathcal{R} . Similarly, since no rules in \mathbf{A} can enable rules in \mathcal{I} or \mathcal{R} , all rules from \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{R} can be applied before any rules from \mathbf{A} . \square

3.2. Encryption-free Needham–Schroeder

As a means of explaining the Dolev–Yao intruder and encryption models using our notation, we begin with an overly simplified form of the Needham–Schroeder protocol. Without encryption, the Needham–Schroeder protocol proceeds as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} A \longrightarrow B : n_a \\ B \longrightarrow A : n_a, n_b \\ A \longrightarrow B : n_b \end{array}$$

where n_a and n_b are fresh nonces, chosen by Alice (A) and Bob (B), respectively.

Sorts. The full Needham–Schroeder protocol uses several sorts, but here the data is all nonces, so we need only one sort, `nonce`. Later when we add more sorts, we will find it convenient to define `nonce` as a subsort of `msg`.

Predicates. We can describe this simplified protocol in our notation using the predicates A_i, B_i, N_i for $0 \leq i \leq 3$, with the following intuitive meaning:

$A_0()$	Alice in state 0 (initial role state)
$A_1(\text{nonce})$	Alice in state 1, with her nonce
$A_2(\text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$	Alice in state 2, with two nonces
$B_0()$	Bob in state 0 (initial role state)
$B_1(\text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$	Bob in state 1, with two nonces
$B_2(\text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$	Bob in state 2, with two nonces
$N_1(\text{nonce})$	Network has message 1, with indicated data
$N_2(\text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$	Network has message 2, with indicated data
$N_3(\text{nonce})$	Network has message 3, with indicated data

The data associated with the state of some principal, or a network message, will depend on the particular state or message. Each principal begins in local state 0, with no data. Therefore, predicates A_0 and B_0 are predicates with no arguments. When Alice chooses a nonce, she moves into local state 1. Therefore, predicate A_1 is a unary predicate of type `nonce`, intended to be the nonce chosen by Alice. Similarly, predicate B_1 is a binary predicate of type `nonce` \times `nonce`, the data received from Alice in message one of the protocol and the nonce chosen by Bob for his response.

The subscripts on the message predicates N_i indicate which message of the protocol is being sent, which implicitly indicates the signature of the message. This format allows participants to distinguish the messages of a protocol. Since we will be considering an environment which includes an intruder (introduced in Section 3.3) that can transform any message from one type to another, this notation will not limit the analysis in any way.

Rules. Using these predicates, we can state the protocol using four transition rules:

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 A_0() & \longrightarrow & \exists x. A_1(x), N_1(x) \\
 B_0(), N_1(x) & \longrightarrow & \exists y. B_1(x, y), N_2(x, y) \\
 A_1(x), N_2(x, y) & \longrightarrow & A_2(x, y), N_3(y) \\
 B_1(x, y), N_3(y) & \longrightarrow & B_2(x, y)
 \end{array}$$

Each rule corresponds to an action by a principal. In the first rule, Alice chooses a nonce, sends it on the network, and remembers the nonce by moving into a local state that retains the nonce value. In the second step, Bob receives a message on the network, chooses his own nonce, transmits it and saves both nonces in his local state. In the third step, Alice receives Bob’s message and replies, while in the fourth step Bob receives Alice’s final message and changes state.

Table 2
Sample trace of encryption-free Needham–Schroeder

$B_0()$,	$A_0()$	\longrightarrow	$A_1(n_a), N_1(n_a),$	$B_0()$
$A_1(n_a),$	$B_0(), N_1(n_a)$	\longrightarrow	$B_1(n_a, n_b), N_2(n_a, n_b),$	$A_1(n_a)$
$B_1(n_a, n_b),$	$A_1(n_a), N_2(n_a, n_b)$	\longrightarrow	$A_2(n_a, n_b), N_3(n_b),$	$B_1(n_a, n_b)$
$A_2(n_a, n_b),$	$B_1(n_a, n_b), N_3(n_b)$	\longrightarrow	$B_2(n_a, n_b),$	$A_2(n_a, n_b)$

If we group the transition rules into roles,

$$\mathcal{A} = \{ A_0() \longrightarrow \exists x. A_1(x), N_1(x), \quad A_1(x), N_2(x, y) \longrightarrow A_2(x, y), N_3(y) \}$$

$$\mathcal{B} = \{ B_0(), N_1(x) \longrightarrow \exists y. B_1(x, y), N_2(x, y), \quad B_1(x, y), N_3(y) \longrightarrow B_2(x, y) \}$$

we see that \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} are bounded role theories, where A_0 and B_0 are initial role state, and $A_1, A_2, B_1,$ and B_2 are role states.

Sample Computation. In Table 2 is a sample trace generated from these rules, beginning from state A_0, B_0 . Spacing is used to separate the facts that participate in each step from those that do not.

3.3. Formalizing the intruder

One of the original motivations for using multiset rewriting for protocol analysis was that this framework allows us to use essentially the same theory for all adversaries that follow the Dolev–Yao model, for all protocols. The precise formulation of the intruder will depend on the message format of the protocol being attacked, and on the type of encryption used, but the basic form of the *standard intruder* will be the same under the Dolev–Yao model.

The Dolev–Yao protocol adversary or “intruder” may nondeterministically choose among the following actions at each step:

- Read any message and block further transmission.
- Decompose a message into parts and remember them, including decrypting any message for which the adversary has obtained the key.
- Generate fresh data as needed.
- Compose a new message from known data and send.

By combining a read with resend, we can easily obtain the effect of passively reading a message without preventing another party from also receiving it.

There are two main parts of the Dolev–Yao model as commonly used in protocol analysis. The first is the set of possible intruder actions, applied nondeterministically throughout execution of the protocol. The second is a “black-box” model of encryption and decryption. We explain the intruder actions here, along with specifying some formal properties that are used to bound the number of intruder steps needed to produce a given message. The encryption model is presented in Section 3.4.

Sorts. We still have the sort `nonce`, but as we will see in Section 3.4, it is convenient for the intruder model to use the sort `msg`, with `nonce` a subsort of `msg`.

Functions. We introduce a new function for pairing, which is abbreviated as

$$\langle _, _ \rangle: \text{msg} \times \text{msg} \rightarrow \text{msg}$$

Predicates. We introduce the basic predicates `D`, `M`, and `C` for the intruder, with the following intuitive meaning:

- `D(msg)` Decomposable messages known to intruder
- `M(msg)` Information stored in intruder “memory”
- `C(msg)` Composable messages known to intruder

Later, when we include encryption in our model and more sortnames are added, these predicates will become more complex, eventually reaching the form shown in Table 7.

Rules. In our model, the intruder processes data in two phases. The first stage is to read and decompose data into parts and remember the parts, and the second stage is to compose a message from the parts it remembers. We will discuss the two-phase intruder more formally in Section 3.5. We illustrate the basic form of the intruder actions for an encryption-free protocol using two of the network-message predicates from the previous example, `N1(nonce)` and `N2(nonce,nonce)`. Using predicates `D` for decomposable messages and `M` for the intruder “memory”, the basic rules for intercepting, decomposing and remembering messages are

$$\begin{aligned} \text{N}_1(x) &\longrightarrow \text{D}(x) \\ \text{N}_2(x, y) &\longrightarrow \text{D}(\langle x, y \rangle) \\ \text{D}(\langle x, y \rangle) &\longrightarrow \text{D}(x), \text{D}(y) \\ \text{D}(z) &\longrightarrow \text{M}(z) \end{aligned}$$

The rules for composing messages from parts are written using the `C`, for “composable”, predicate as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{M}(x) &\longrightarrow \text{C}(x), \text{M}(x) \\ \text{C}(x) &\longrightarrow \text{N}_1(x) \\ \text{C}(x), \text{C}(y) &\longrightarrow \text{C}(\langle x, y \rangle) \\ \text{C}(\langle x, y \rangle) &\longrightarrow \text{N}_2(x, y) \end{aligned}$$

The rule for generating new data is

$$\longrightarrow \exists x. \text{M}(x)$$

The reason we need the last transition rule (which can be applied any time without any hypothesis) is that the intruder may need to choose new data in order to trick an honest participant in a protocol. This is illustrated in the sample computation shown below.

Note that a simpler equivalent intruder model can be formulated by removing the explicit composition and decomposition predicates. Specifically, if all $C()$ and $D()$ predicates are replaced by $M()$ and redundant rules are removed, the above nine rules can be reduced to seven rules. We choose to model an explicit two-phase intruder for two reasons. First, the two-phase model is useful in directing proof search techniques in an implementation based on MSR, such as the LLF implementation mentioned in [14]. Second, for our complexity results we need to be able to prove poly-time decidability of the intruder actions. The proof in Lemma 3.13 is facilitated by the two-phase intruder model, though as we mention in Section 3.5 alternate proof techniques are also available.

Sample Computation. An attack on the encryption-free (and obviously insecure) portion of the Needham–Schroeder protocol is shown in Table 3. Here we have the actions of the honest participants in the left column and the actions of the intruder indented. For simplicity, duplicate copies of $M()$ facts are not shown, since these have no effect on the execution of the protocol or intruder.

In this attack, the intruder intercepts messages between A and B , replacing data so that the two principals have a different view of the messages that have been exchanged. Specifically, the intruder replaces Alice’s nonce n_a by a value n chosen by the intruder. When Bob responds to the altered message, the intruder intercepts the result and replaces n by n_a so that Alice receives the message she expects. Introducing encryption eliminates this attack.

3.4. Modeling perfect encryption

The commonly used “black-box” model of encryption may be written in our multiset notation using the following vocabulary. For concreteness, we discuss public-key encryption. Symmetric or private-key encryption can be characterized similarly. For simplicity we will identify principal identities with their public keys.

Sorts. We introduce several new sorts, including `cipher` for ciphertext, `d_key` for decryption keys and `e_key` for encryption keys. Since data can be transformed by encryption into a different type, and the type of an encrypted message can’t be known until the message is decrypted, we choose to introduce an order-sorted algebra [35]. This approach also serves to keep the signatures of our functions and predicates reasonably simple.

We introduce `msg` as the super-sort, with the following relations: `nonce < msg`, `cipher < msg`, `d_key < msg`, `e_key < msg`.

Table 3
Sample attack on encryption-free Needham–Schroeder

$B_0(), A_0()$	Initial configuration
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), N_1(n_a), B_0()$	Alice chooses nonce and sends
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_0(), D(n_a)$	Intruder intercepts message n_a
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_0(), M(n_a)$	Intruder learns value n_a
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_0(), M(n_a), M(n)$	Intruder generates fresh value n
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_0(), M(n_a), M(n), C(n)$	Intruder begins composing message
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), N_1(n), B_0(), M(n_a), M(n)$	Intruder sends n to Bob
$\rightarrow B_1(n, n_b), N_2(n, n_b), A_1(n_a), M(n_a), M(n)$	Bob receives, generates nonce, replies
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), D((n, n_b))$	Intruder intercepts message with n
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), D(n), D(n_b)$	Intruder decomposes message
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b)$	Intruder learns value n_b
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b), C(n_a), C(n_b)$	Intruder starts composing message
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b), C((n_a, n_b))$	Intruder composes message
$\rightarrow A_1(n_a), N_2(n_a, n_b), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b)$	Intruder sends message with n_a
$\rightarrow A_2(n_a, n_b), N_3(n_b), B_1(n, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b)$	Alice receives and responds
$\rightarrow B_2(n, n_b), A_2(n_a, n_b), M(n_a), M(n), M(n_b)$	Bob changes to final state, indicating successful completion of protocol

Predicates. The predicates from the previous simpler example remain, though with their sort types modified appropriately to account for encryption. For example the role states must now remember information about principals’ public keys, and the network messages are now encrypted. These predicates are described in detail in Section 4.

We introduce new predicates related to management of encryption keys. $KP(e_key, d_key)$ is used for associating public/private key pairs, and $AnnK(e_key)$ indicates that a public key has been published. We also introduce the predicate $GoodGuy(e_key, d_key)$, which is used to identify the honest participants of the protocol, and their keys. The list of predicates for the full theory is shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7.

Functions. In addition to the pairing function from the previous section,

$$\langle _, _ \rangle: msg \times msg \rightarrow msg$$

we introduce a function for encryption,

$$\text{enc} : \text{e_key} \times \text{msg} \rightarrow \text{cipher}$$

It is not necessary to include a decryption function $\text{dec} : \text{d_key} \times \text{cipher} \rightarrow \text{msg}$, since we write protocols using pattern-matching (encryption on the left-hand-side of a rule) to express decryption.

Rules. The core Needham–Schroeder protocol with encryption assumes that each principal has a previously generated keypair with a published public key. We simulate this in the initialization theory, with rules of the following form.

$$\begin{array}{l} \longrightarrow \exists k_e.k_d.\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d) \\ \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d) \longrightarrow \text{AnnK}(k_e), \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d) \end{array}$$

The first rule (without hypothesis) generates a keypair for an honest principal. The second rule announces the public key so it is accessible to other roles and to the intruder.

New roles are generated in the role generation theory, which generates the initial role states for each instance of a protocol role. These rules are of the following form:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d) \longrightarrow \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), \text{A}_0(k_e) \\ \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d) \longrightarrow \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), \text{B}_0(k_e) \end{array}$$

Here any honest participant can choose to participate as either the initiator or the responder, by generating the appropriate initial role state.

Finally, the first step of the protocol is changed to include encryption and the use of the published public keys. Alice’s first step becomes the following:

$$\text{AnnK}(k'_e), \text{A}_0(k_e) \longrightarrow \exists x.\text{A}_1(k_e, k'_e, x), \text{N}_1(\text{enc}(k'_e, \langle x, k_e \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e)$$

Here Alice chooses to talk to somebody whose public key has been announced. She generates a nonce as before, and then sends out the first message encrypted by the public key she has selected.

The following transition rule then allows Bob to decrypt the message from Alice and send a reply.

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{B}_0(k_e), \text{N}_1(\text{enc}(k_e, \langle x, k'_e \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e) \longrightarrow \\ \exists y.\text{B}_1(k_e, k'_e, x, y), \text{N}_2(\text{enc}(k'_e, \langle x, y \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e) \end{array}$$

The complete initialization theory, role generation theory and protocol theories for Needham–Schroeder are shown in Section 4.

Intruder. To model the encryption capabilities of the intruder, we add a decomposition and a composition rules of the following basic form to the intruder model. The decomposition rule allows the intruder to decrypt a message (or part of a message) when the decryption key is known.

$$\begin{aligned} & D(\text{enc}(k, x)), KP(k, k'), M(k') \\ \longrightarrow & D(x), KP(k, k'), M(k'), M(\text{enc}(k, x)) \end{aligned}$$

The composition rule allows the intruder to encrypt a message with any encryption key known to the intruder.

$$M(k), C(x) \longrightarrow C(\text{enc}(k, x)), M(k)$$

A complete example of the rules defining an intruder for Needham–Schroeder (including more complex sorts and some other changes explained in Section 3.5), is shown in Table 7.

3.5. Two-phase intruder theory

In this subsection, we formally specify the properties of intruder theories that are required in order to bound the number of intruder steps needed to produce a given message. We make use of a standard notion from proof theory based on the normalization of proofs for natural deduction. This strategy was first applied to security protocols by [19], who explain that the actions of the standard intruder can be syntactically separated into two phases – a decomposition phase in which messages are decomposed into smaller parts, and a composition phase in which these parts are (re)assembled into a new message. This *two-phase intruder* provides us with a proof search strategy that is the basis for the decidability of the intruder actions.

First we will need to define some new terms.

Definition 3.7. The *size* of an atomic formula is the number of symbols it contains. We count one for the predicate name, one for each function name, and one for each variable or constant symbol. We introduce the notation $|f|$ to indicate “size of atomic formula f ”.

For example, $|P(x, y)| = 3$, and $|P(f(x, y), z)| = 5$.

Definition 3.8. A *weighting function* is a function $f \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ that maps atomic formulas to numeric weights. We introduce the notation $\mathcal{W}(P(x))$ to indicate the “weight of atomic formula $P(x)$ ”. The relative weight of formulas must be preserved under substitution, i.e., if A and B are atomic formulas and σ is a substitution, then

$$\mathcal{W}(A) > \mathcal{W}(B) \implies \mathcal{W}(\sigma A) > \mathcal{W}(\sigma B).$$

We will use weighting functions to guarantee termination.

Many weighting functions are possible, but we are interested in a class of functions that calculate the weight based on a pair $\langle n, P \rangle$, where n is a number indicating the size of the atomic formula, and P is the predicate name. We define a strict (non-reflexive) partial-ordering on the predicates of a theory. A particular theory has a particular ordering. For example in the standard intruder model, $\mathbf{D} > \mathbf{M}$, and $\mathbf{C} > \mathbf{M}$. An example ordering of the predicates for the intruder theory is shown in Table 7. The ordering is defined for formulas $P(x)$ and $P'(x')$, as follows: $\langle |P(x)|, P \rangle < \langle |P'(x')|, P' \rangle$ if $|P(x)| < |P'(x')|$ or $|P(x)| = |P'(x')|$ and $P < P'$.

For example, if \mathbf{N} , \mathbf{D} , and \mathbf{M} are predicates with $\mathbf{N} > \mathbf{D} > \mathbf{M}$, then

$$\mathcal{W}(\mathbf{D}(\langle x, y \rangle)) > \mathcal{W}(\mathbf{D}(x))$$

$$\mathcal{W}(\mathbf{M}(\langle x, y \rangle)) > \mathcal{W}(\mathbf{D}(x))$$

$$\mathcal{W}(\mathbf{N}(x)) > \mathcal{W}(\mathbf{D}(x))$$

An example of a weighting function that conforms to these constraints is as follows:

$$\mathcal{W}_1(P(x)) := 10 * |P(x)| + val(P)$$

where val is a function mapping predicate names to numbers, represented as a set of ordered pairs as follows:

$$val := \{(\mathbf{N}, 4), (\mathbf{D}, 3), (\mathbf{M}, 1), (\mathbf{C}, 3)\}$$

Here the value “10” is arbitrarily chosen to be larger than any of the values appearing in the val function.

Definition 3.9. A rule $R = \ell \longrightarrow r$ is a *decomposition rule* with respect to weighting function \mathcal{W} if the total weight of the terms in r is less than the total weight of the terms in ℓ . A rule $R = \ell \longrightarrow r$ is a *composition rule* with respect to weighting function \mathcal{W} if the total weight of the terms in r is greater than the total weight of the terms in ℓ .

For example,

$$\mathbf{D}(\langle x, y \rangle) \longrightarrow \mathbf{D}(x), \mathbf{D}(y)$$

is a decomposition rule with respect to weighting function \mathcal{W}_1 , and

$$\mathbf{C}(x), \mathbf{C}(y) \longrightarrow \mathbf{C}(\langle x, y \rangle)$$

is a composition rule with respect to weighting function \mathcal{W}_1 .

For the intruder theories we will consider, we allow persistent facts to appear in both the left and right hand sides. So, in general a decomposition rule is of form:

$$D(\langle A, B \rangle), \vec{P}(\dots) \longrightarrow D(A), D(B), \vec{P}'(\dots)$$

where \vec{P} and \vec{P}' are sets of persistent predicates, with $\vec{P} \subseteq \vec{P}'$ (and similarly for composition rules).

We also need to introduce more complicated decomposition rules, which we call “Decomposition rules with Auxiliary facts”. These are pairs of rules of form:

$$D(t), \vec{P}(\dots) \longrightarrow \vec{P}'(\dots), A(t)$$

and

$$A(t), \vec{Q}(\dots) \longrightarrow \vec{Q}'(\dots), D(t')$$

where $\vec{P} \subseteq \vec{P}'$, $\vec{Q} \subseteq \vec{Q}'$, $A < D$, and $|t'| < |t|$. Here, A represents an Auxiliary fact (which can appear only in a pair of rules of this form) which is used to amortize the decomposition of $D(t)$ into $D(t')$ across the two rules. Section 4.4 shows an example of this type of decomposition rule, used to allow decrypting an old fact with a newly learned encryption key.

Definition 3.10. A theory \mathcal{T} is a *two-phase* theory if its rules can be divided into three theories that share no non-persistent predicates, $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{C} \uplus \mathcal{D}$, where \mathcal{I} is a bounded sub-theory preceding \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{D} , \mathcal{C} contains only composition rules, \mathcal{D} contains only decomposition rules, and no rules in \mathcal{C} precede any rules in \mathcal{D} .

Definition 3.11. A *normalized derivation* is a derivation where all rules from the initialization theory are applied first, then all rules from the decomposition theory are applied before any rules from the composition theory.

It is shown in [19] in a slightly different context that, with the restriction that keys must be atomic, all derivations in a two-phase theory can be transformed into normalized derivations.

Definition 3.12. A protocol theory is *limited to atomic keys* if its signature does not contain any functions that return data of type \mathbf{e}_{key} or \mathbf{d}_{key} .

Lemma 3.13. *Given a state S , a two-phase intruder theory \mathcal{M} with a signature that is limited to atomic keys, and a target message X : it is decidable in polynomial time whether the message X is derivable from the state S using the theory \mathcal{M} .*

Proof. We construct a polynomial-time decision procedure for testing whether message X is derivable from state S using the theory \mathcal{M} . We use the decomposition rules of \mathcal{M} to decompose the state S into a set of base facts B . Then we use the composition rules of \mathcal{M} “backwards” to decompose the goal message X into a set of base facts B' . The message X is derivable if $B' \subseteq B$.

The algorithm is as follows: Let \mathcal{D} be the decomposition theory of \mathcal{M} , and let \mathcal{C} be the composition theory. We write $S - T$ for multiset difference and $S \uplus T$ for multiset union. If $\ell \longrightarrow r$ is a rule and σ a substitution, then $\sigma\ell$ and σr are multisets.

1. Decompose state S into base facts B using rules from \mathcal{D} .
 - (a) $S_0 = S$.
 - (b) Repeat until no more rules in \mathcal{D} can be applied:
 - i. Find a rule $\ell \longrightarrow r$ in \mathcal{D} with $\sigma\ell \in S_i$, for some substitution σ .
 - ii. $S_{i+1} = (S_i - \sigma\ell) \uplus \sigma r$.
 - (c) $B = S_i$.
2. Let P be the persistent facts in B (i.e., for our Standard Intruder, P contains all the $M()$ facts from B).
3. Decompose goal message X into base facts B' using rules from \mathcal{C} and the persistent facts from B .
 - (a) $S_0 = \{X\} \uplus P$.
 - (b) Repeat until no more rules in \mathcal{C} can be applied:
 - i. Find a rule $\ell \longrightarrow r$ in \mathcal{C} with $\sigma r \in S_i$, for some substitution σ .
 - ii. $S_{i+1} = (S_i - \sigma r) \uplus \sigma\ell$.
 - (c) $B' = S_i$.
4. If $B' \subseteq B$ then ACCEPT else REJECT.

This procedure terminates because of the properties of the composition and decomposition rules, which guarantee that the total size of the multiset gets smaller for each application of a decomposition rule, and larger for each application of a composition rule (or in this case smaller, since we are applying them in reverse). In this comparison, the size of the multiset is the sum of the sizes of the formulas it contains.

Note that the order of the choice of rule in Step 1b doesn't matter. Each rule selects a particular term and decomposes it, but this doesn't effect other terms not mentioned in that rule. So the state B that results in Step 1c is the same no matter what order the rules were applied. Similarly for Steps 3b and 3c.

To show correctness of the algorithm, we need to prove the two directions. If message X is derivable by theory \mathcal{M} from state S , then the procedure ACCEPTs. Since the message is derivable, that means it can be obtained from S using a normalized derivation that applies rules from the decomposition theory \mathcal{D} first, followed by

rules from the composition theory \mathcal{C} . Let d be the set of decomposition rules used in the derivation, and let d' be the decomposition rules used in Step 1. Let D be the facts derived by applying the rules in d . Since we apply all possible decomposition rules in Step 1, we know that $d \subseteq d'$, so $D \subseteq B$. The derivation uses composition rules c to construct fact X , possibly along with other facts, from D . Meanwhile, Step 3 decomposes fact X into its component facts, set B' , so $B' \subseteq D$. So we have $D \subseteq B \wedge B' \subseteq D$, which means $B' \subseteq B$, and the procedure ACCEPTs.

For the reverse direction, if the procedure ACCEPTs, then the message X is derivable by theory \mathcal{M} from state S . If the procedure accepts, we can construct a derivation that applies all the rules from Step 1, then all the rules from Step 3 in the forward direction. Since $B' \subseteq B$, we know that X can be derived from the facts in B , so a valid derivation of X can be constructed. \square

Note that because \mathcal{M} is a two-phase theory, we only need to apply the above procedure once. No term produced by a rule in \mathcal{C} can appear on the left-hand side of a rule in \mathcal{D} , so applying the composition theory does not enable any new rules to be applied in the decomposition theory. Without the restriction to atomic keys, the forward direction of our proof would fail, because the application of rules in \mathcal{C} might result in the creation of a new key that would allow new messages to be decrypted using rules in \mathcal{D} . Rusinowitch and Turuani present a proof in a slightly different setting, representing message terms as Directed Acyclic Graphs, which removes this restriction to atomic keys [60]. McAllester has also shown a general method for proving the tractability of sets of inference rules [49].

3.6. Protocol and intruder

The primary goal of security protocol analysis is to try to find flaws in a protocol – to find attack scenarios that result in the failure of properties such as secrecy or authentication, or ultimately to prove that a protocol is correct (*i.e.* that no attacks are possible). In the MSR framework, we consider the interaction of a well-founded protocol theory with a two-phase intruder theory, by analyzing *standard traces* of the protocol.

Definition 3.14. Given a well-founded protocol theory $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{R} \uplus \mathbf{A}$ and a two-phase intruder theory \mathcal{M} , a *standard trace* is a derivation that has all steps from the \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{R} first, then interleaves steps from the principal theories \mathbf{A} with normalized derivations from the intruder theory \mathcal{M} .

The notion of a standard trace is a useful one for reasoning about the complexity of security protocols, as we will see in Section 5.

The intruder is easily formalized as a set of rewrite rules. While the basic intruder steps remain the same from one protocol to the next, the exact formalization depends on the form of messages used in the protocol. A specific instance of the *standard intruder* is described in some detail in Section 4.4.

4. Example: Needham–Schroeder public key protocol

In this section, we present the full theory of the three-step core of the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol, which is shown in Table 1. The sorts and functions for the signature are shown in Table 4, with the predicates introduced as needed in the table for each sub-theory. An example of a two-phase intruder is shown in Table 7.

4.1. Initialization theory

The Initialization Theory \mathcal{I} , for a public key system without a trusted server, is shown in Table 5. Here, the predicate **GoodGuy** indicates an uncompromised principal, parameterized by its encryption and decryption (public and private) keys. For simplicity, we identify the principal with its public key (i.e., where “A” appears in the protocol, we use the public key “ K_a ”). The **GOODGUY** rule allows for the creation

Table 4
Needham–Schroeder theory signature

Sorts:	
e_key	: encryption key (and principal name)
d_key	: decryption key
cipher	: cipher text (encrypted)
nonce	: nonces
msg	: data of any type
Subsorts: nonce < msg, cipher < msg, e_key < msg, d_key < msg	
Functions:	
enc	: e_key \times msg \rightarrow cipher : encryption
< _, _ >	: msg \times msg \rightarrow msg : pairing

Table 5
Public key initialization theory

Predicates:	
GoodGuy(e_key, d_key)	: identity of an honest participant
BadKey(e_key, d_key)	: keys of a dishonest participant
KP(e_key, d_key)	: encryption key pair
AnnK(e_key)	: published public key
Initialization Theory \mathcal{I}:	
GOODGUY:	$\rightarrow \exists k_e, k_d. \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d)$
BADKEY:	$\rightarrow \exists k_e, k_d. \text{BadKey}(k_e, k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d)$
ANNK:	$\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d) \rightarrow \text{AnnK}(k_e), \text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d)$
ANNKB:	$\text{BadKey}(k_e, k_d) \rightarrow \text{AnnK}(k_e), \text{BadKey}(k_e, k_d)$

of an unlimited number of principals, each with a unique key pair, denoted by the predicate **KP**.

The **BADKEY** rule provides a mechanism for specifying an unlimited number of compromised key pairs, which appear to belong to valid principals, but whose private keys are known to the intruder. The predicate **BadKey** denotes these compromised key pairs. There is no need to distinguish between the case of an honest participant who does follow the protocol but has had his keys compromised, and the case where the intruder himself is simply posing as an honest participant, but is not constrained to follow the protocol. This is because the intruder can simply simulate the first case, by performing the steps of the protocol, if he wants. I.e., there is no need to have both **GoodGuy**(k, k') and **BadKey**(k, k') facts generated for the same keys.

We accomplish key distribution by having the principals announce their public keys. The **ANNK** rule accomplishes this for the **GoodGuy** participants, while the **ANNKB** rule does the same for the **BadKey** pairs. Note that both rules generate a predicate **AnnK** indicating a public key that is available for communication, so from this point the honest participants can not distinguish the good guys from the bad guys.

Note that in order for the Initialization theory to be a bounded-sub theory, as defined in Definition 3.4, all the predicates that appear on the left-hand side of the rules (i.e., **GoodGuy**, **KP**, **BadKey** and **AnnK**) must be persistent in the protocol theory. This can be verified by examining how these predicates are used in each of the rules of the Role Generation and Role theories in Table 6.

4.2. Role Generation Theory

The Role Generation Theory \mathcal{R} is shown in Table 6. Rules **ROLA** and **ROLB** allow an unlimited number of sessions to be started for any principal to act in the role of either “Alice” (the initiator) or “Bob” (the responder). \mathbf{A}_0 and \mathbf{B}_0 denote the initial role states for the A and B roles, respectively, parameterized by the public key (principal) acting in that role.

Note that this theory satisfies Definition 3.3, since the rules involve only the persistent predicate **GoodGuy**, and the initial role states \mathbf{A}_0 and \mathbf{B}_0 , which appear only on the right hand side of the rules.

4.3. Protocol Role Theories

The Role Theories, shown in Table 6, are derived directly from the specification of the Needham–Schroeder protocol. Theory \mathcal{A} corresponds to the role of “Alice”, and theory \mathcal{B} corresponds to “Bob”.

In rule **A1**, which corresponds to the first line of the protocol, a principal k_e , in its initial state \mathbf{A}_0 , decides to talk to another principal k'_e , whose key has been announced. A new nonce x is generated, along with a network message N_{S1} corresponding to the first message sent in the protocol, and the principal moves to the new

Table 6
Needham–Schroeder theory

Predicates:

$A_0(\text{e_key})$:	Role state 0 for initiator
$A_1(\text{e_key}, \text{e_key}, \text{nonce})$:	Role state 1 for initiator
$A_2(\text{e_key}, \text{e_key}, \text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$:	Role state 2 for initiator
$B_0(\text{e_key})$:	Role state 0 for responder
$B_1(\text{e_key}, \text{e_key}, \text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$:	Role state 1 for responder
$B_2(\text{e_key}, \text{e_key}, \text{nonce}, \text{nonce})$:	Role state 2 for responder
$N_{S_i}(\text{cipher})$:	$(i = 1, 2, 3)$ encrypted message (sent)
$N_{R_i}(\text{cipher})$:	$(i = 1, 2, 3)$ encrypted message (received)

Role Generation Theory \mathcal{R} :

ROLA:	$\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d)$	\longrightarrow	$\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), A_0(k_e)$
ROLB:	$\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d)$	\longrightarrow	$\text{GoodGuy}(k_e, k_d), B_0(k_e)$

Protocol Theories \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} :

A1:	$\text{AnnK}(k'_e), A_0(k_e)$	\longrightarrow	$\exists x. A_1(k_e, k'_e, x), N_{S_1}(\text{enc}(k'_e, \langle x, k_e \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e)$
A2:	$A_1(k_e, k'_e, x), N_{R_2}(\text{enc}(k_e, \langle x, y \rangle))$	\longrightarrow	$A_2(k_e, k'_e, x, y), N_{S_3}(\text{enc}(k'_e, y))$
B1:	$B_0(k_e), N_{R_1}(\text{enc}(k_e, \langle x, k'_e \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e)$	\longrightarrow	$\exists y. B_1(k_e, k'_e, x, y), N_{S_2}(\text{enc}(k'_e, \langle x, y \rangle)), \text{AnnK}(k'_e)$
B2:	$B_1(k_e, k'_e, x, y), N_{R_3}(\text{enc}(k_e, y))$	\longrightarrow	$B_2(k_e, k'_e, x, y)$

state A1, remembering the values of x and k'_e . Note that since AnnK is persistent, it must also appear on the right hand side of the rule.

In step B1, corresponding to the second step of the protocol, a principal k_e , in the initial state B_0 , responds to a message on the network which is of the expected format (i.e., encrypted with k_e 's public key, and with the identity of a participant whose key has been announced, embedded inside). k_e generates another nonce, and replies to the message, moving to a new state B_1 where all the information (the two nonces and the two principals) is remembered.

Similarly, A2 corresponds to the third line of the protocol, and B2 corresponds to the implicit step where the responder actually receives the final message.

Note that sent messages are denoted by N_{S_i} and received messages are denoted by a corresponding predicate N_{R_i} . The minimal intruder theory can be thought of as providing a network that transforms N_{S_i} 's to N_{R_i} 's, so the protocol can execute. There are several ways to encode protocol theories using our MSR formalism. For example an alternate encoding could use a single N predicate for all network messages. In the presence of an intruder, these alternate encodings are all logically equivalent,

because the intruder can transform from one network predicate to another, so we have chosen the one that seems most convenient for our purposes.

4.4. Intruder theory

The Intruder Theory, which is an example of a Standard Two-Phase Intruder, is shown in Table 7. Here the M_* predicates denotes persistent facts known to the intruder, while D , A and C represent non-persistent facts which can be decomposed and composed into other facts.

LRNKB and LRNK are initialization rules that allows the intruder to learn keys. Since the *BadKey* and *AnnK* predicates are generated only by the initialization theory, we know from Lemma 2.4 that this rule only needs to be applied once per derivation, per *BadKey* and *AnnK* fact.

The REC and SND rules are used to connect the intruder to the network being used by the participants. The REC rule intercepts a message from the network and saves it as a decomposable fact. The SND rule sends composed facts onto the network.

The COMP rule allow the user to compose small terms into larger ones, while the DCMP rule allows for decomposition of large terms into smaller ones.

LRN converts a decomposable fact into intruder knowledge, and USE converts intruder knowledge into a composable fact.

The ENC and DEC rules allow the intruder to decrypt a message if it knows the private key, and to generate encrypted message from known public keys.

Note that LRNA and DECA are decomposition rules with auxiliary facts that handle a special case for encrypted messages. If the message can't be decrypted because the key isn't currently known, LRNA remembers the decrypted message with the special "Auxiliary" predicate, A . The DECA rule allows Auxiliary messages to be decrypted at a later time, if the decryption key becomes known.

Finally, GEN allows the intruder to generate new facts (i.e., nonces) as needed. We could also include rules to generate other new data types, such as dynamic keys, but we omit those here because they are not relevant to our Needham–Schroeder example.

We expand the weighting function described in Section 3.5 to include the predicates used here, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{W}_2(P(x)) := 10 * |P(x)| + val(P)$$

where

$$val := \{(N_{Si}, 4), (D, 3), (A, 2), (M_*, 1), (N_{Ri}, 4), (C, 3)\}$$

This Intruder Theory can be divided into Composition and Decomposition rules, as shown in Table 7. So, this is a Two-Phase Intruder Theory with respect to weighting function \mathcal{W}_2 , as described in Section 3.1.

Table 7
Two-phase intruder theory

Variables: $x : \text{msg}, y : \text{msg}, n : \text{nonce}, c : \text{cipher}, k_e : \text{e_key}, k_d : \text{d_key}$

Predicates:

$M_{\text{ek}}(\text{e_key})$: fact in intruder memory (encryption key)
$M_{\text{dk}}(\text{d_key})$: fact in intruder memory (decryption key)
$M_{\text{n}}(\text{nonce})$: fact in intruder memory (nonce)
$M_{\text{c}}(\text{cipher})$: fact in intruder memory (ciphertext)
$D(\text{msg})$: decomposable fact
$C(\text{msg})$: composable fact
$A(\text{cipher})$: auxiliary fact (for deferred decryption)

Ordering of Predicates: $N_{\text{Si}} > D > A > M_{*}$ and $N_{\text{Ri}} > C > M_{*}$

Weighting Function: $\lambda_{\mathcal{V}_2}$

Initialization Rules:

LRNKB:	$\text{BadKey}(k_e, k_d)$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{ek}}(k_e), M_{\text{dk}}(k_d), \text{BadKey}(k_e, k_d)$
LRNK:	$\text{AnnK}(k_e)$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{ek}}(k_e), \text{AnnK}(k_e)$

I/O Rules:

REC:	$N_{\text{Si}}(x)$	\longrightarrow	$D(x)$
SND:	$C(x)$	\longrightarrow	$N_{\text{Ri}}(x)$

Decomposition Rules:

DCMP:	$D(\langle x, y \rangle)$	\longrightarrow	$D(x), D(y)$
LRNEK:	$D(k_e)$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{ek}}(k_e)$
LRNDK:	$D(k_d)$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d)$
LRNN:	$D(n)$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{n}}(n)$
DEC:	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d), D(\text{enc}(k_e, x))$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d), D(x), M_{\text{c}}(\text{enc}(k_e, x))$
LRNA:	$D(\text{enc}(k_e, x))$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{c}}(\text{enc}(k_e, x)), A(\text{enc}(k_e, x))$
DECA:	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d), A(\text{enc}(k_e, x))$	\longrightarrow	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d), \text{KP}(k_e, k_d), D(x)$

Composition Rules:

COMP:	$C(x), C(y)$	\longrightarrow	$C(\langle x, y \rangle)$
USEEK:	$M_{\text{ek}}(k_e)$	\longrightarrow	$C(k_e), M_{\text{ek}}(k_e)$
USEDK:	$M_{\text{dk}}(k_d)$	\longrightarrow	$C(k_d), M_{\text{dk}}(k_d)$
USEN:	$M_{\text{n}}(n)$	\longrightarrow	$C(n), M_{\text{n}}(n)$
USEC:	$M_{\text{c}}(c)$	\longrightarrow	$C(c), M_{\text{c}}(c)$
ENC:	$M_{\text{ek}}(k_e), C(x)$	\longrightarrow	$C(\text{enc}(k_e, x)), M_{\text{ek}}(k_e)$
GEN:		\longrightarrow	$\exists n. M_{\text{n}}(n)$

5. Complexity results

In this section, we investigate the complexity of secrecy for bounded protocols of a restricted form. More specifically, we give upper bounds that are as general as possible, and lower bounds that apply to as restricted a subset of the protocol as possible. In general, a secrecy specification stipulates that certain “secret” data must not fall into the hands of the intruder. This is a derivability or reachability problem in our framework: given an initial secret such as $A_0(S)$, indicating that a secret S is known to principal A at the beginning of a protocol run, is there a run of the protocol and intruder in which the adversary learns S , i.e., $M(S)$ appears in the state of the system?

5.1. Restricted protocol form

The purpose of the initialization theory, in our framework, is to formalize the choice of initial conditions, such as shared public or private keys. However, as we have defined protocol theories, there are few restrictions on the form of initialization theories. Since derivability in multiset rewriting is undecidable, we can prove trivial lower bounds by encoding complex problems into the initialization theory. However, this kind of lower bound would not shed any light on protocol analysis. In order to avoid this essentially degenerate case, we will analyze decidability and complexity for protocol theories with initialization theories that consist only of a finite set of ground facts, and no rewrite rules. Intuitively, this means that we analyze decidability and complexity of the role generation and protocol execution phases, under the assumption that initialization has already been completed.

In addition, there are undecidability results for models that allow either an unbounded number of tuplings [36], or unbounded nesting of encryption and decryption [29]. So we will consider derivations that limit both the length of messages and the depth of encryption, by bounding the size of the ground facts that can appear in a derivation.

We also restrict the form of the protocol roles. In our previous examples, a step of a protocol role A has the form

$$\begin{aligned} &A_i(\dots), N_{R_j}(\dots), P(\dots), Q(\dots), \dots \\ \rightarrow &\exists \dots A_k(\dots), N_{S_\ell}(\dots), P(\dots), Q(\dots), \dots \end{aligned}$$

where $A_i(\dots)$ and $A_k(\dots)$ are role states, $N_{R_j}(\dots)$ and $N_{S_\ell}(\dots)$ are network messages, and $P(\dots), Q(\dots), \dots$ are persistent facts appearing on the left and right of the rule. However, for the purpose of proving a stronger negative result, we restrict our attention to a simpler form of protocol step in this section, by omitting the persistent facts.

With these restrictions in mind, we come to the following definitions:

Definition 5.1. A role \mathcal{P} of agent A is a *restricted role* if

- Its role states are drawn from a finite list of predicates, A_1, \dots, A_a .
- The network predicates N_{R_j} and N_{S_ℓ} are drawn from a finite list of predicates N_{R_1}, \dots, N_{R_n} and N_{S_1}, \dots, N_{S_n} .
- It contains only rules of form

$$A_i(\dots), N_{R_j}(\dots) \rightarrow \exists \dots A_k(\dots), N_{S_\ell}(\dots)$$

where A_i and A_k are role states, and N_{R_j} and N_{S_ℓ} are network predicates, with $i < k \leq a$ and $j < \ell \leq n$, in each rule.

Definition 5.2. A protocol theory $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{R} \uplus \mathbf{A}$ is in *restricted form* if

- The initialization theory \mathcal{I} is a set of ground facts.
- \mathcal{R} is a role generation theory.
- \mathbf{A} is a finite set of roles, each a restricted role.

5.2. Secrecy decision problem

Even with a protocol in restricted form, there are several interesting cases to consider, depending on whether where the number of existentials and roles is bounded, and on whether the derivation bound on the term size is fixed or varying.

We define a set of protocol scenarios as follows:

$$\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}} = \{ \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle \mid \text{For ground term } S \text{ ("the Secret"), there exists a run of protocol theory } \mathcal{T} \text{ with standard intruder } \mathcal{M} \text{ leads to a state containing } \mathbf{M}(S), \text{ such that at most } n \text{ protocol nonces, at most } r \text{ role instances, and facts of size at most } k \text{ appear in the run.} \}$$

Intuitively, $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the set of protocol scenarios that contain an attack. Deciding membership in $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is equivalent to deciding if an attack on a protocol exists. There are a variety of secrecy decision problems that can be defined, depending on how the parameters of the set are specified. The four cases we consider here are:

For each natural number. $k, \mathcal{S}_{size=k}$: Given $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S$ decide if there exists n, r such that $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

\mathcal{S}_{nonceb} : Given $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, k$ decide if there exists r such that $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

\mathcal{S}_{roleb} : Given $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, r, k$ decide if there exists n such that $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

For each natural number. $k, \mathcal{S}_{nonceb, size=k}$: Given $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n$ decide if there exists r such that $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

We are now ready to present the main results for this section:

Theorem 1. $\mathcal{S}_{size=k}$ is undecidable for every k greater than some small value.

Theorem 2. \mathcal{S}_{nonceb} with no disequality test is DEXP-complete.

Theorem 3. \mathcal{S}_{roleb} is NP-complete.

Theorem 4. $\mathcal{S}_{nonceb, size=k}$ with no disequality test is in P.

Proof. Theorem 1 follows from the upper bound (Proposition 5.1) in Section 5.4.1 and the lower bound (Proposition 5.5) in Section 5.5.2.

Theorem 2 follows from the upper bound (Proposition 5.2) in Section 5.4.2 and the lower bound (Proposition 5.6) in Section 5.5.3.

Theorem 3 follows from the upper bound (Proposition 5.3) in Section 5.4.3 and the lower bound (Proposition 5.7) in Section 5.5.4.

The proof of Theorem 4 is in Section 5.4.4. \square

Open Problem. The series of ??? in the box at the top of column two of Table 9 indicates an unresolved question for \mathcal{S}_{nonceb} , when disequality tests are allowed.

5.3. Protocol complexity matrix

Table 8 shows a summary of the complexity results for the main theorems presented in this paper. The two main columns consider the case of whether the number of roles is bounded or unbounded. This refers to the number of instances of each role (i.e., the number of protocol sessions) that are allowed to participate in a protocol run. In the left column the role generation theory \mathcal{R} is bounded, meaning we fix in advance the maximum number r of rules from \mathcal{R} that can be used to generate a protocol role instance, and then consider all runs with r or fewer roles. In the right two sub-columns, \mathcal{R} is not bounded, meaning runs with an arbitrary number of roles need to be considered.

Table 8
Protocol theory complexity overview

		Unbounded # Roles	
		bounded \exists	Unbounded \exists
Term size fixed	P	P	Undec.
in all instances		(Theorem 4)	(Theorem 1)
Term size varies	NPC	DEXPC	Undec.
per instance	(Theorem 3*)	(Theorem 2)	

*A stronger result with no limit on term size is in [3,60].

Table 9

Protocol theory complexity matrix

		Bounded # Roles		Unbounded # Roles		
				bounded \exists	Unbounded \exists	
I with \exists	\neq	(5.3*)	NPC	???	(5.1)	Undec.
	$=$		NPC	(5.2)	DEXPC	Undec.
I no \exists	\neq		NPC		DEXPC	Undec.
	$=$	(5.7)	NPC	(5.6)	DEXPC	(5.5) Undec.

*A stronger result with no limit on term size is in [3,60].

The second column is further sub-divided according to whether the number of existentials instantiated during execution in these roles is bounded or not. If the number of existentials is bounded, then we fix in advance the maximum number n of protocol nonces, and consider all runs with n or fewer nonces. Because the number is fixed, the nonces can be assumed to have been produced during initialization, and not within the roles themselves.

The two rows of Table 8 consider whether the term size k is fixed in all instances of the problem, or whether the term size is allowed to vary as a parameter of the problem.

For each entry of the matrix in Table 8, we show the complexity result for that case, using “P” to indicate the problem is in polynomial time, “NPC” for NP-complete, “DEXPC” for DEXP-complete, and “Undec”. for Undecidable. The entries also indicate which theorem is applicable in each case.

Table 9 is a more detailed summary of the complexity results, where we show more detail about the results for the upper and lower bounds. The columns are the same as in Table 8, but now the two main rows consider whether the intruder is allowed to generate fresh values or not. These rows are further subdivided into the cases where the roles can perform disequality tests which would allow them to determine whether two fresh values are different from each other. The \neq row allows both equality and disequality tests, while the $=$ row allows only equality tests. In a protocol, a test for disequality on a nonce would mean the protocol compares a supposedly fresh nonce it receives against all the other nonces it has received, to make sure it is actually fresh. If disequality is not allowed, then this test is not performed.

Table 9 shows the complexity results for these cases, using the same notation as for Table 8. The numeric references indicate the propositions about specific lower or upper bounds which we discuss in the following sections. With the exception of the top case of column two (bounded roles with existentials and disequality test, and intruder with unbounded existentials), we will see that the lower bounds apply to all cases above them in the table, and the upper bounds apply to all cases below them.

5.4. Upper bounds

5.4.1. Reachability for protocols is r.e. (Theorem 1)

Proposition 5.1. $\mathcal{S}_{size=k}$ is recursively enumerable.

Proof. This is immediate because we can enumerate all the execution sequences, i.e., all the computations of the protocol. \square

5.4.2. \mathcal{S}_{nonceb} without disequality is in DEXP (Theorem 2)

Proposition 5.2. \mathcal{S}_{nonceb} without disequality tests is in DEXP.

Proof. We prove that \mathcal{S}_{nonceb} without disequality tests has a deterministic exponential time decision procedure. Given $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, k$, the algorithm runs in time $O((|\mathcal{T}| + |\mathcal{M}| + n)^k)$, where $|\mathcal{T}|$ and $|\mathcal{M}|$ are the sizes of the protocol role theories and the intruder theory, respectively.

We restrict the protocol theory by placing a bound on the number of existentials that can be generated during protocol execution. First, we consider the case without disequality tests, where the intruder cannot generate any existentials, the number of roles is unbounded, but the number of existentials generated by the protocol theory is bounded. This corresponds to the bottom box in the second column of Table 9. Then we show that the upper bound also holds for the two boxes above this one in the table, when we introduce the disequality test, and when the intruder can generate existentials (but with no disequality test).

First we observe that bounding the number of protocol existentials means that we can generate all the existentials used by all runs of the protocol during the initialization phase. No new data can be generated during protocol execution, and k gives a limit on the size of any ground fact that can appear in a run. Therefore we have a fixed alphabet Σ of size $O(|\mathcal{T}| + |\mathcal{M}| + n)$, and there is an exponential $|\Sigma|^k$ bound on the number of distinct ground facts that may appear in any possible protocol execution.

Next we observe that because role-generation is unlimited and no role creates new data, each role can be re-run as many times as desired. More specifically, if \mathcal{I} is the initialization theory, and fact $P(\vec{t})$ is in a state S derivable from \mathcal{I} by the role generation and protocol rules, then there is another state $S' \supseteq S$ containing an additional occurrence of $P(\vec{t})$ that can also be derived from \mathcal{I} by the role generation and protocol rules. Specifically this means that our algorithm can freely apply any rule from any role, as many times as needed, because it is always possible to apply the earlier rules from that role in order to create the required role state for the rule we want to apply.

In short, our algorithm can treat all facts as if they were persistent facts, since role-states can always be regenerated, and network messages can always be replayed by the intruder.

Therefore, we can decide whether a fact $M(S)$ is derivable by the following decision procedure:

1. Set $F :=$ a set containing the ground facts from \mathcal{I} .
2. Set $R :=$ a set containing all ground instances of the rules from $\mathcal{T} + \mathcal{M}$.
3. Repeat:
 - (a) Select a rule $\ell \longrightarrow r$ from R .
 - (b) Apply the rule if $\ell \subseteq F$.
 - (c) $N := r$, i.e., $N :=$ the facts generated by applying the rule to F .
 - (d) $F := F + N$.
4. Until $F + N = F$ for all rules in R .
5. If fact $M(S) \in F$, return YES, else return NO.

Since there is an exponential bound on the number of bounded-length facts that can be written over the signature, this process will terminate in exponential time. This decision procedure resembles the DEXP upper bound for Datalog, once we observe that all role steps can be repeated as many times as needed [22,38,65].

In the case where the protocol roles can test for disequality, as long as no new nonces can be produced during execution (i.e., the intruder can't create any nonces), the disequality tests just further restrict which rules are applicable in a state. This might decrease the number of reachable facts, but the above algorithm still works, and it does not affect the upper bound.

Similarly, although we have presented this upper bound in terms of a protocol in restricted form, in fact the upper bound still holds for protocols whose roles contain persistent facts, i.e., it holds for roles that are not in restricted form. This is because the presence of additional persistent predicates in the LHS of rules just further restricts which rules are applicable in a state. As with disequality tests, this might decrease the number of reachable facts, but does not affect the upper bound. The above decision procedure would still work.

The above argument assumes that the number of intruder existentials is bounded. However, in the case where the roles cannot test for disequality, any attack with more than one nonce provided by the intruder can be reduced to an attack with only one new nonce provided by the intruder. Therefore, in the absence of a disequality test, the intruder with one new nonce is equivalent to the intruder with unlimited new nonces. So this case is also in DEXP. \square

5.4.3. Bounded roles is in NP (Theorem 3)

In the following section we prove our result for the case of theories with bounded term size whose signature uses only atomic keys, i.e., theories in which the signature cannot contain any functions that return messages of type \mathbf{e}_{key} or \mathbf{d}_{key} . Since our original result (which is unpublished until now, but was mentioned in the presentation of [26]) several stronger results have been reported. Both [3,60] show that the problem with bounded roles and with unbounded message size is in NP. In addition [60] extends this result to non-atomic keys, and the [3] result includes disequality tests.

Proposition 5.3. \mathcal{S}_{roleb} , with the signature for \mathcal{T} and \mathcal{M} restricted to non-atomic keys, is in NP.

Proof. We prove that \mathcal{S}_{roleb} has a non-deterministic polynomial-time decision procedure.

Recall from Definition 5.2 that $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{I} \uplus \mathcal{R} \uplus \mathbf{A}$. We restrict the protocol theory by placing a bound on the number of role instances that can be generated by the role generation theory \mathcal{R} , i.e., we place a limit r on the number of initial role states that can appear in any run, by limiting how many times the rules in \mathcal{R} can be used. The number of existentials generated by the intruder is not bounded, and tests for disequality (as well as equality) are allowed. This corresponds to the top box in the first column of Table 9.

To prove this upper bound we present a decision procedure that takes as a witness a polynomial length input representing an instantiation of a sequence of protocol rules used in an attack run. The decision procedure verifies that the intruder is capable of generating the messages necessary to make the run valid, and it verifies whether the run is actually an attack. We show that this decision procedure has a polynomial running time.

First we show that a candidate attack run is of polynomial length. Let R be the maximum number of steps in the longest role of the protocol. Since we limit the number of roles to r , any attack contains at most rR protocol steps.

Next we observe that, although we have allowed the intruder to use an unlimited number of nonces in his attack, in fact the limited size of the protocol run means that the number of nonces that are relevant to the attack has a polynomial bound. Since each message is limited to size k , there can be at most k different values in a given message, or a maximum of kR values for a given role. Thus, the maximum number of distinct values that can occur in an attack run of at most r roles is bounded by $B = krR$. For a given attack, only at most B of the nonce's generated by the intruder can actually appear in the protocol steps of the run.

Note that the number of nonces generated by the protocol is also bounded by the value B . As in Section 5.4.2, the protocol nonces can be generated during the role generation phase, instead of during protocol execution. So in our analysis we can treat protocol nonces as constants that are included in the initial role state, and only consider the intruder-generated nonces during the protocol execution.

Using these observations, we can construct an a candidate attack run of polynomial length, as follows:

1. Guess a set of at most $B = krR$ nonces to be used by the intruder in the attack. These are included in the intruder's initial knowledge, i.e., for each nonce $n_i \in \{n_0, \dots, n_B\}$, $\mathbf{M}(n_i) \in \mathcal{I}$.
2. Guess a selection of up to r roles to be generated from the role generation theory \mathcal{R} . Note that these role state facts include as arguments any nonces that would be generated by the protocol roles. Call this set of initial role states I_r .

3. Guess a candidate sequence of up to rR protocol steps for the attack. The rules used in the candidate attack are fully instantiated, using the values from \mathcal{I} , I_r , and the B intruder nonces in a specific way. Let $N \leq rR$ be the number of steps in the candidate sequence, and label each step in the sequence s_i , for $1 \leq i \leq N$.

Since the protocol is in restricted form, and no nonces are generated by the protocol roles during the run, we know from Definition 5.1 that all roles must be of the form:

$$A_i(\dots), N_{R_j}(\dots) \rightarrow A_k(\dots), N_{S_\ell}(\dots)$$

where A_i and A_k are role states, and N_{R_j} and N_{S_ℓ} are network predicates. Note that if the N_{R_j} is missing from the rule (as in the case of the first step of an initiator role), then a null message body can be used, so all rules can be assumed to be of this form.

To verify that the candidate attack sequence is a valid protocol run, we must confirm that each step in the sequence is feasible. This involves verifying that the protocol role sequence is valid (i.e., each role state is used only once, and they are not used in a step until after they have been generated), and that the network messages needed at each step can be generated by the intruder from knowledge it has available at that step.

Let S_i be the current multiset of facts after step s_i . Let $S_0 = I + I_r$, where I is the multiset of facts from the initialization theory \mathcal{I} and I_r is the set of initial role states generated in step 2 above. For each rule

$$s_i : A_i(\vec{m}), N_R(\vec{n}) \rightarrow A_j(\vec{m}'), N_S(\vec{n}')$$

we do the following:

1. Check that $A_i(\vec{m}) \in S_{i-1}$. If not, **REJECT**.
2. Decompose the target message $N_R(\vec{n})$ into its smallest components by applying rules from the intruder composition theory in reverse, until a set of persistent M predicates remain. Call this set of M terms M .
3. Check that $M \subseteq A_{i-1}$. If not, **REJECT**.
4. Fully decompose the term $N_S(\vec{n}')$ by applying all rules from the intruder decomposition theory until only the persistent M predicates remain. Call this set of M terms M' .
5. Update $S_i := (S_{i-1} \uplus \{A_j(\vec{m}')\} \uplus M') - \{A_i(\vec{m})\}$
6. Increment i .

After repeating the above procedure for all N rules, check if $M(S) \in S_N$. If yes, then **ACCEPT** (meaning this is an attack sequence), if not **REJECT**.

Since the size of each message is bounded by k , the above steps can each be done in polynomial time. We do not go into detail here about steps 2 and 4, but for our

standard two-phase intruder theory, we know from Lemma 3.13 that they can be accomplished in polynomial time. Similar algorithms are presented in [19,60].

Since the number of protocol steps is polynomial, that means a candidate attack sequence can be verified in polynomial time. Therefore, \mathcal{S}_{roleb} is in NP.

This upper bound also holds for the case where the intruder is not allowed to generate nonces, or when disequality tests are not allowed, since the decision procedure still works on these more restricted protocols. So the upper bound holds for all cases in the first column of Table 9. \square

5.4.4. Bounded roles and fixed k is in P (Theorem 4)

We view the result for bounded roles and fixed k ($\mathcal{S}_{nonceb,size=k}$) to be of limited interest, but include it here for completeness.

Proposition 5.4. $\mathcal{S}_{nonceb,size=k}$ without disequality tests is in P.

Proof. The proof technique is the same as for Proposition 5.2. We have a fixed alphabet Σ of size $O((|\mathcal{T}| + |\mathcal{M}| + n))$, and there is a $|\Sigma|^k$ bound on the number of distinct ground facts that may appear in any possible protocol execution. If k is a constant, then the number of ground terms is polynomial instead of exponential, and the running time of the algorithm is polynomial.

This case is analogous to the data complexity of Datalog in [22].

Note that the same restriction on disequality tests applies as in Proposition 5.2. If the intruder is allowed to generate nonces and the protocol roles are able to test for disequality, then the alphabet is no longer fixed, and this proof fails. \square

5.5. Lower bounds

In this section we examine the lower bounds. The proofs make use of a reduction from Horn clauses to protocols in restricted form, so we examine that reduction first. Horn clauses without function symbols are undecidable if existentials are allowed, and DEXP-hard without existentials. Our proof is by reduction from existential Horn clauses without function symbols to protocol theories in restricted form. The reduction introduces function symbols in the protocol theory, but not in the Horn clauses.

Also note that these proofs do not rely on any use of existentials from the intruder, nor on the use of disequality tests. This means that one lower bound suffices for each column in the complexity matrix.

5.5.1. Representing Horn clauses as protocol theories

An *existential Horn clause* is a closed first-order formula of the form

$$\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_i [(\alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_k) \implies \exists y_1 \dots \exists y_j (\beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_\ell)]$$

where $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_\ell$ are first-order atomic formulas.

We will show that, given a Horn theory that consists of a set of existential Horn formulas, we can construct a protocol so that, when combined with the standard intruder theory, the intruder may learn a representation of a formula iff it is a consequence of the Horn theory.

Our encoding uses the intruder to replicate formulas. Since each protocol role can only execute a finite sequence of steps, we use a separate role for each Horn clause. The function of the intruder is to convert the final message sent by one role to an initial message received by another role. As a result of intruder actions, a datum may pass through an unbounded number of protocol steps.

In order to represent the Horn theory faithfully, we cannot give the intruder complete access to the atomic formulas used in a Horn clause. In particular, we cannot let the intruder combine data from different messages. For example, if one role sends a message representing $P(a, b)$, we cannot allow the intruder to intercept this message and replace it with $P(b, a)$. We prevent this form of interference by encrypting atomic formulas with a shared private key.

We define an encoding of a conjunction of atomic formulas into a single term of type `msg`. We use the notation $\lceil \phi \rceil$ to indicate the encoding of formula ϕ , where $\phi = P_1(t_{1,1}, \dots, t_{1,i_1}) \wedge \dots \wedge P_k(t_{k,1}, \dots, t_{k,i_k})$.

For this encoding we use a secret key K which is not known by the intruder, and we assume that for each sequence of predicates P_1, \dots, P_k that occurs together in the left or right hand side of a given Horn clause, we have a constant symbol $P_1.P_2.\dots.P_k$. (Although we have used a sequence of letters, numbers and subscripts to write out our name for this constant symbol, we assume it is an atomic constant symbol of the language.)

Given these assumptions, we let

$$\begin{aligned} & \lceil P_1(t_{1,1}, \dots, t_{1,i_1}) \wedge \dots \wedge P_k(t_{k,1}, \dots, t_{k,i_k}) \rceil \\ &= \text{enc}(K, \langle P_1.P_2.\dots.P_k, t_{1,1}, \dots, t_{1,i_1}, t_{k,1}, \dots, t_{k,i_k} \rangle) \end{aligned}$$

Note that the size of the terms arising from $\lceil \phi \rceil$ is linear in the size of the terms in ϕ . Specifically, calculating term size as we defined in Definition 3.7, if ϕ contains p predicates each of maximum size s , then $|\lceil \phi \rceil| \leq 3 + p * s$.

We encode a given existential Horn clause C into a set of protocol roles. One role represents the clause itself, and in addition, for each conjunction of atomic formulas that appears in the Horn theory, we need a way to create that conjunction from atomic formulas, and to decompose it into atomic formulas. We define $\text{Role}(C) = \mathcal{R}(C) + \mathcal{C}(C) + \mathcal{D}(C)$, where $\mathcal{R}(C)$ is the role corresponding to clause C , and $\mathcal{C}(C)$ and $\mathcal{D}(C)$ are the composition and decomposition roles for clause C .

The role $\mathcal{R}(C)$ for a clause C

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_i [(\alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_k) \\ & \implies \exists y_1 \dots \exists y_j (\beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_\ell)] \end{aligned}$$

is

$$\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{Ra}_0}(\lceil \alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_k \rceil) \longrightarrow \exists y_1 \dots \exists y_j. \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{Sa}_1}(\lceil \beta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \beta_\ell \rceil)$$

where $i, j \geq 0, k, \ell \geq 1$. For example, the role for a pure Horn clause

$$\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_i [(\alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_k) \implies \beta]$$

is

$$\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{Ra}_0}(\lceil \alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_k \rceil) \longrightarrow \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{Sa}_1}(\lceil \beta \rceil).$$

The representation of the composition role $\mathcal{C}(C)$ and the decomposition role $\mathcal{D}(C)$ is perhaps best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the existential Horn clause

$$\forall x \forall y [(P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \wedge R(y)) \implies \exists z (P(z) \wedge Q(y, z))]$$

is part of the Horn theory we wish to represent by a protocol. In order to use this implication, the protocol must produce a message containing $\lceil (P(a) \wedge Q(a, b) \wedge R(b)) \rceil$ for some a and b . However, the protocol roles that represent Horn clauses produce encodings of conjunctions of atomic formulas, and the atomic formulas here may come from different rules. Therefore, we need additional protocol roles that select atomic formulas out of conjunctions and combine them.

The process is very similar to the encoding of the two-phase intruder in Section 3.5, except that protocol roles can manipulate encrypted values. For each conjunction form (including variables) that appears on the right-hand side of a Horn clause, such as $P(z) \wedge Q(y, z)$, we include *decomposition roles* of the form

$$\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{R0}}(\lceil P(z) \wedge Q(y, z) \rceil) \longrightarrow \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{S1}}(\lceil P(z) \rceil)$$

and

$$\mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{R0}}(\lceil P(z) \wedge Q(y, z) \rceil) \longrightarrow \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{S1}}(\lceil Q(y, z) \rceil)$$

for predicates $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1$ not used for other roles. We also need a *composition role* for the left-hand-side of each original Horn clause. For the clause above, the role will have states $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2$ and \mathbf{A}_3 . At each step, the role reads one of the atomic formulas in its target conjunction, sending out either a dummy message or, at the last

step, a message containing the conjunction of atomic formulas needed. In order to assemble $\lceil (P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \wedge R(y)) \rceil$, we can use a role A with the following steps:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{N}_{R0}(\lceil P(x) \rceil) \longrightarrow \mathbf{A}_1(\lceil P(x) \rceil), \mathbf{N}_{S1}() \\ & \mathbf{A}_1(\lceil P(x) \rceil), \mathbf{N}_{R2}(\lceil Q(x, y) \rceil) \longrightarrow \\ & \quad \mathbf{A}_2(\lceil P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \rceil), \mathbf{N}_{S3}() \\ & \mathbf{A}_2(\lceil P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \rceil), \mathbf{N}_{R4}(\lceil R(y) \rceil) \longrightarrow \\ & \quad \mathbf{A}_3(), \mathbf{N}_{S5}(\lceil P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \wedge R(y) \rceil) \end{aligned}$$

After this role sends message \mathbf{N}_{S5} , the intruder can read the data $\lceil P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \wedge R(y) \rceil$ contained in this message and forward it to the role representing the Horn clause with hypothesis $P(x) \wedge Q(x, y) \wedge R(y)$.

Given a set of existential Horn clauses H , we define an encoding into a protocol theory in restricted form, $\mathcal{P}(H) = \bigcup_{\phi \in H} \text{Role}(\phi)$.

Lemma 5.3. *The construction of $\mathcal{P}(H)$ from H is computable in polynomial time. Furthermore, if H has no existential quantifiers, then $\mathcal{P}(H)$ has no existential quantifiers.*

Proof. If a Horn clause theory H consists of n clauses $\{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n\}$ with a maximum conjunction size of m atomic formulas in any clause, then the corresponding protocol theory $\mathcal{P}(H)$ contains n 1-step roles $\mathcal{R}(C_i)$, one corresponding to each clause, plus a set of up to m 1-step decomposition roles in each $\mathcal{D}(C_i)$ for each conjunction on the right hand side of a clause C_i , and a (at most) m -step composition role $\mathcal{C}(C_i)$ for the conjunction on the left hand side of the clause C_i . Thus the encoding is polynomial and $O(mn)$. \square

Lemma 5.4. *Let $\mathcal{P}(H)$ be the encoding of a set of existential Horn clauses H into a restricted protocol theory, let ϕ be a formula, and let \mathcal{M} be a standard two-phase intruder theory. A run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ can lead to a state containing $\mathbf{M}(\lceil \phi \rceil)$ iff ϕ is derivable from H . Furthermore, if the formulas in H have maximum term size bounded by s , then the run $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{*} \mathbf{M}(\lceil \phi \rceil)$ has a maximum term size $f(s)$, where f is a linear function of s .*

Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of derivations. We need to prove both directions. First we show that if $H \vdash \phi$ then a run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ can lead to a state containing $\mathbf{M}(\lceil \phi \rceil)$.

First consider the base case. If ϕ is initially true, that is equivalent to a Horn clause of form

$$\text{true} \implies \phi$$

From our construction, the clause C_i yields a protocol role

$$A_0, N_{RA0}() \longrightarrow A_1, N_{SA1}(\lceil \phi \rceil)$$

The intruder can obtain $M(\lceil \phi \rceil)$ by the following sequence:

$$\begin{aligned} M() &\longrightarrow C() \\ C() &\longrightarrow N_{RA0}() \\ A_0, N_{RA0}() &\longrightarrow A_1, N_{SA1}(\lceil \phi \rceil) \\ N_{SA1}(\lceil \phi \rceil) &\longrightarrow D(\lceil \phi \rceil) \\ D(\lceil \phi \rceil) &\longrightarrow M(\lceil \phi \rceil) \end{aligned}$$

This proves the base case.

For the induction step, assume from our derivation up to clause C_{i-1} , we have proven $H \vdash \{\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{n-1}\}$ and the intruder knows $\{M(\lceil \phi_0 \rceil), M(\lceil \phi_1 \rceil), \dots, M(\lceil \phi_{n-1} \rceil)\}$. Suppose the next clause C_i in the derivation is

$$\phi_0 \wedge \phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_{n-1} \implies \exists \vec{z}. \phi_n(\vec{z})$$

From our construction this yields a protocol theory $Role(C_i) = \mathcal{R}(C_i) + \mathcal{C}(C_i) + \mathcal{D}(C_i)$, where $\mathcal{R}(C_i)$ is

$$A_0^i, N_{RA0}^i(\lceil \phi_0 \wedge \phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_{n-1} \rceil) \longrightarrow \exists \vec{z}. A_1^i, N_{SA1}^i(\lceil \phi_n(\vec{z}) \rceil)$$

And $\mathcal{C}(C_i)$ is

$$\begin{aligned} C_0^i, N_{RC0}^i(\lceil \phi_0 \rceil) &\longrightarrow C_1^i(\lceil \phi_0 \rceil), N_{SC1}^i() \\ C_1^i(\lceil \phi_0 \rceil), N_{RC1}^i(\lceil \phi_1 \rceil) &\longrightarrow C_2^i(\lceil \phi_0 \wedge \phi_1 \rceil), N_{SC2}^i() \\ &\dots \\ C_{n-2}^i(\lceil \phi_0 \wedge \phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_{n-2} \rceil), N_{RCn-2}^i(\lceil \phi_{n-1} \rceil) &\longrightarrow C_{n-1}^i(), N_{SCn-1}^i \\ &(\lceil \phi_0 \wedge \phi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_{n-1} \rceil) \end{aligned}$$

Using these roles ($\mathcal{D}(C_i)$ is not needed here), it is possible for the intruder to construct a run that results in $M(\lceil \phi_n \rceil)$ in a manner similar to the base case above.

Next we show that if a run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ can lead to a state containing $M(\lceil \phi \rceil)$ then $H \vdash \phi$.

Initially if the intruder memory contains $M(\lceil \phi \rceil)$, this corresponds to a clause true $\implies \phi$.

Suppose the intruder knows $\{M(\lceil\phi_0\rceil), M(\lceil\phi_1\rceil), \dots, M(\lceil\phi_{n-1}\rceil)\}$ after executing role R_{i-1} , and our corresponding derivation has proven $H \vdash \{\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{n-1}\}$. From our construction, the next role R_i used by the intruder to obtain $M(\lceil\phi_n\rceil)$ will be of type $\mathcal{R}(C)$, $\mathcal{D}(C)$, or $\mathcal{C}(C)$, for some clause $C \in H$.

If the role is of form $\mathcal{R}(C)$, then this corresponds directly to the clause C .

If the role is of form $\mathcal{D}(C)$, then this corresponds to a use of the logical axiom

$$A \wedge B \wedge C \implies A$$

If the role is of form $\mathcal{C}(C)$, then this corresponds to a use of the logical axiom

$$A \wedge B \implies (A \wedge B)$$

So in each case, after the intruder executes the next role in the derivation to obtain $M(\lceil\phi_n\rceil)$, it is possible to prove ϕ_n from H by using a clause C corresponding to that role.

Consider the maximum term size appearing in the run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$. Each term occurring in the run (in both the intruder steps and the protocol steps) is just a predicate applied to $\lceil\phi\rceil$, for some ϕ in H . So if $n = \|\lceil\phi\rceil\|$ for the largest term ϕ in H , then the maximum term size occurring in the derivation from a protocol step is just $k = n + 1$. Since $\|\lceil\phi\rceil\|$ is linear in the size of ϕ , the maximum term size occurring in the run is linear in the size of the formulas in H . \square

5.5.2. $\mathcal{S}_{size=k}$ is Undecidable (Theorem 1)

For the case of unbounded roles and unbounded existentials (the rightmost column in Table 9), we turn to results from Database theory, where the complexity results for Embedded Implicational Dependencies (EIDs) [17] and Datalog [22] can be applied. Embedded Implication Dependencies are exactly Horn clauses with existentials and equality, as defined in Section 5.5.1. In [17], this problem is proved to be undecidable, by a reduction from the halting problem for a two-counter machine. A reduction can also be made from the halting problem for a Turing machine, as we show in Appendix A.1.

Without restriction on the form of the atomic formulas, undecidability of the implication problem for existential Horn clauses follows immediately from the undecidability of Horn clauses without existential quantifiers. The problem of interest to us, however, is implication when the atomic formulas contain no function symbols.

Proposition 5.5. $\mathcal{S}_{size=k}$ is undecidable for every derivation term size greater than some small value k .

Proof. Our proof is a reduction from existential Horn clauses. Given any set H of existential Horn clauses with no function symbols, and a formula ϕ , we can construct a protocol theory in restricted form $\mathcal{P}(H)$. We know from Lemma 5.3 that the

number of roles in $\mathcal{P}(H)$ is polynomial in the number and size of the Horn clauses in H . If \mathcal{M} is a standard two-phase intruder, then a run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ can lead to a state containing $\mathbf{M}(\phi)$ iff ϕ is derivable from H . This follows from Lemma 5.4. Since the derivability problem is undecidable by reduction from the halting problem (Lemma A.2), the secrecy problem for protocol theories is also undecidable.

Furthermore as shown in Appendix A.1, it is possible to encode a Turing machine using Horn clauses of relatively small size (we use conjunctions of up to 8 predicates, each with up to 3 arguments). Since we know from Lemma 5.4 that the maximum term size occurring in the run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ is linear in the size of the predicates in H , then the minimum term size k required for undecidability is also small. \square

Note that the Turing machine encoding in Appendix A.1 leads to the result that $\mathcal{S}_{\text{size}=k}$ is Undecidable for all values of $k > \approx 30$, but we haven't made any special effort in our construction to achieve a small term size.

5.5.3. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{nonceb}}$ is DEXP-hard (Theorem 2)

In the case of no existentials, both [22] and [17] show a DEXP lower bound. In fact, DEXP-hardness follows by the same encoding of Horn formulas (Datalog programs, or full embedded implicational dependencies) as in our undecidability proof, applied to Horn clauses without function symbols and without existential quantification. For these Horn theories, DEXP-hardness of the implication problem (measured as a function of the size of the theory) is implicit in [38,65], as explained in [22]. The lower bound for Horn theories is similar to the Turing machine representation for the unbounded case, using a form of “symbolic counter” instead of Skolem symbols to name the cells in a bounded section of the Turing machine tape.

Proposition 5.6. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{nonceb}}$ is DEXP-hard.

Proof. Our proof is a reduction from Horn clauses without existential quantifiers. Given any set H of Horn clauses without existential quantifiers or function symbols, and a formula ϕ , we can construct a protocol theory in restricted form $\mathcal{P}(H)$. We know from Lemma 5.3 that this construction is polynomial in size. If \mathcal{M} is a standard two-phase intruder, then a run of $\mathcal{P}(H) + \mathcal{M}$ can lead to a state containing $\mathbf{M}(\phi)$ iff ϕ is derivable from H . This follows from Lemma 5.4, since the construction doesn't require any protocol or intruder nonces. Since the derivability problem for non-existential Horn clauses is DEXP-hard by reduction from Deterministic Turing Machines (DTM) with exponential running time (Lemma A.4), the secrecy problem for protocol theories with bounded nonces is also DEXP-hard. \square

Note that the Horn clauses constructed in Appendix A.2 use a term size that is proportional to the running time of the problem (exponential in the input to the problem, w). This means that runs of a protocol $\mathcal{P}(H)$ implementing those Horn clauses have a maximum term size, k_w , which is exponential in the size of the input to the problem. DEXP-hardness only applies to the secrecy problem $\mathcal{S}_{\text{nonceb}}$ for values of $k \geq k_w$.

5.5.4. \mathcal{S}_{roleb} is NP-hard (Theorem 3)

Here we consider a restricted protocol theory where the Intruder can not generate existentials, the number of instances of each role is bounded, and no disequality tests are allowed. This corresponds to the bottom box in the first column of Table 9.

We can prove this problem is NP-hard by reducing Turing machines to Horn clauses, similar to the proofs for Theorems 1 and 2. A direct Turing machine proof was used for the result reported in the workshop for [26]. Subsequently, several authors have shown a direct reduction from 3-SAT to prove NP-hardness for this case [2,60]. Since that proof is straightforward, we reproduce here the reduction from [60], modified to use our restricted protocol theory notation.

3-SAT is a version of the satisfiability problem in conjunctive normal form, with exactly three literals per clause [63, p. 249]. We define an instance of 3-SAT, and some notation as follows

- Propositional Variables $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$.
- Literals $L = v$ or $L = \neg v$.
- Clause $C = L \vee L' \vee L''$.
- Formula $F = C \wedge C' \wedge \dots \wedge C''$.

Given a formula F , let C_i be the i -th conjunct, $L_{i,j}$ be the j -th literal of the i -th conjunct, and $x_{i,j} \in V$ be the variable appearing in the literal $L_{i,j}$. We can write $L_{i,j} = x_{i,j}^{\epsilon_{i,j}}$, where $\epsilon_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $x^0 = x$ and $x^1 = \neg x$.

Thus an instance of 3-SAT with variables V and clauses I can be written $F(V) = \bigwedge_{i \in I} C_i$.

Table 10 shows a protocol theory \mathcal{P}_{3SAT} in restricted form that corresponds to an encoding of an instance of the 3-SAT problem. This is a general construction for all

Table 10
3-SAT theory \mathcal{P}_{3SAT}

A: $A_0, N_{R0}(v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n)$	→	$A_1, N_{S1}(\text{enc}(P, (f_1(V), f_2(V), \dots, f_m(V), \text{end})))$
B: $B_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle \top, x, y, z \rangle))$	→	$B_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
B': $B'_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle \text{enc}(K, \neg \top), x, y, z \rangle))$	→	$B'_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
C: $C_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle x, \top, y, z \rangle))$	→	$C_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
C': $C'_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle x, \text{enc}(K, \neg \top), y, z \rangle))$	→	$C'_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
D: $D_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle x, y, \top, z \rangle))$	→	$D_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
D': $D'_0, N_{R1}(\text{enc}(P, \langle x, y, \text{enc}(K, \neg \top), z \rangle))$	→	$D'_1, N_{S2}(\text{enc}(P, z))$
E: $E_0, N_{R2}(\text{enc}(P, \text{end}))$	→	$E_1, N_{S3}(S)$

instances of 3-SAT, with the particular instance encoded into the details of the initialization role, role A . The input to role A is a message containing assignments of \top and $\neg\top$ to each of the propositional variables v_i . It outputs a message representing the 3-SAT encoding with a special token end appended, encrypted with the secret key P which is shared by the protocol roles, but not known to the intruder. This message encodes each clause C_i using the function $f_i()$ which is described below. The roles B, B', C, C', D, D' each examine a 3-tuple of the encoding, and if it contains either \top or $\{\neg\top\}_K$ (both representations of “true”), then it strips off the 3-tuple and returns the rest of the encoding. The final role E broadcasts the secret S if it receives a message containing the special token $\{\text{end}\}_P$.

In the encoding of the literals, we use encryption to represent logical negation, i.e., $\neg x \mapsto \{x\}_K$, and $x = \{\neg x\}_K$. We introduce the function $g()$ to formalize this:

- $g(0, x) = x$.
- $g(1, x) = \{x\}_K$.

Finally, each clause C_i is encoded by a function $f_i()$ in role A as follows:

- $\forall i \in I, f_i(V) = \langle g(\epsilon_{i,1}, x_{i,1}), g(\epsilon_{i,2}, x_{i,2}), g(\epsilon_{i,3}, x_{i,3}) \rangle$.

For example, if the clause $C_1 = v_1^0 \vee v_2^1 \vee v_4^0$, then $f_1(V) = \langle g(0, v_1), g(1, v_2), g(0, v_4) \rangle = \langle v_1, \{v_2\}_K, v_4 \rangle$.

Proposition 5.7. \mathcal{S}_{roleb} is NP-hard.

Proof. By reduction from 3-SAT. By construction, the intruder can guess a solution and run to completion iff the instance of 3-SAT is satisfiable.

Given a set of propositional variables V , a set of clauses I , and an instance of 3-SAT $F(V) = \bigwedge_{i \in I} C_i$, construct $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle$, where S is a secret, \mathcal{M} is a standard intruder, and \mathcal{T} is the 3-SAT theory constructed as described above and shown in Table 10. Specifically, $r = |I|$, i.e., the number of role instances needed is equal to the number of 3-SAT conjuncts. The number of nonces needed is zero. The maximum term size that appears in the attack, k_I , is proportional to the number of clauses in I , since the largest term appearing in the attack will be the output term $N_{S1}()$ from role A of the protocol. So, the attack is possible for any $k > k_I$.

Given $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}, S, n, r, k \rangle$, with $n \geq 0$, $r \geq |I|$ and $k \geq k_I$, and an initial intruder knowledge of $\{\mathbf{M}(\top), \mathbf{M}(\neg\top)\}$, the intruder can learn the secret $\mathbf{M}(S)$ by broadcasting a message containing a solution of the 3-SAT problem on the network and then transforming the various network message formats to make the protocol run. Thus, there is an attack on the protocol \mathcal{P}_{3SAT} iff the corresponding 3-SAT problem has a solution. \square

6. Examples: lower bounds as protocols

The previous section examined the complexity of security protocols in terms of the Multiset rewriting formalism, but it may be useful to examine the phenomena

that cause protocols to be difficult to analyze, using a more common and less formal notation.

6.1. An exponential attack without nonces

Here we present a simple protocol construction that gives some intuition for the exponential lower bound. This is not a formal proof, but it shows an example where even without generating new data, determining a security property may require exponentially-many runs of a protocol. This particular example was helpful to the authors in gaining the intuition that inspired the undecidability and exponential lower bound results.

Consider the following example, which shows a fragment of an audited key distribution protocol, for one key server and s clients. The protocol for integer s assumes that a private symmetric key K is shared between the principals A, B_1, \dots, B_s and C . (The same effect can be achieved in a public key protocol, by first running secure key exchange steps.) Here A is a key server, B_1, \dots, B_s are clients, and C is an audit process.

In Table 11 we show the protocol for $s = 4$. There are s Server/Client sub-protocols, one for each client. In these sub-protocols A sends a value which corresponds to a certain binary pattern, and B_i responds by incrementing the pattern by one. We use the notation x_i to indicate the “don’t care” values in the messages

Table 11	
Rules for exponential protocol, $s = 4$	
Keys: K – symmetric key shared by A, B_i, C	
Server/Client Protocols:	
$A \longrightarrow B_1 : \{x_1, x_2, x_3, 0\}_K$	
$B_1 \longrightarrow A : \{x_1, x_2, x_3, 1\}_K$	
$A \longrightarrow B_2 : \{x_1, x_2, 0, 1\}_K$	
$B_2 \longrightarrow A : \{x_1, x_2, 1, 0\}_K$	
$A \longrightarrow B_3 : \{x_1, 0, 1, 1\}_K$	
$B_3 \longrightarrow A : \{x_1, 1, 0, 0\}_K$	
$A \longrightarrow B_4 : \{0, 1, 1, 1\}_K$	
$B_4 \longrightarrow A : \{1, 0, 0, 0\}_K$	
Audit Protocols:	
$A \longrightarrow C : \{0, 0, 0, 0\}_K$	
$C \longrightarrow A : \text{OK}$	
$A \longrightarrow C : \{1, 1, 1, 1\}_K$	
$C \longrightarrow A : \text{SECRET}$	

in the Server/Client sub-protocols. For example, in the protocol between A and B_1 , in the first step A sends a message $\{x_1, x_2, x_3, 0\}_K$, which consists of four digits, ending in a zero, encrypted by the key K . The first three digits in this messages are represented by x_1, x_2 , and x_3 , indicating that B_1 doesn't check those values (they can be either 0 or 1). In the second step, if B_1 sees the 0 he is expecting in the last digit if the message he received, he responds by incrementing the value he received from A , i.e., B_1 sends $\{x_1, x_2, x_3, 1\}_K$, where the x_1, x_2 , and x_3 are the same values received in Step 1.

The protocol suite also includes two audit sub-protocols. In the first protocol the server A sends a message of all zero's to C to indicate that the protocol finished correctly. In the second protocol, A sends a message of all one's to indicate that there is an error. The second audit protocol has the side-effect of broadcasting the **SECRET** if C receives the error message.

If no attacker is present, a run of this protocol would consist of $2s + 1$ messages, with the final message of all zero's sent to C , which responds with **OK**. However, if a Dolev–Yao intruder is present, he can route an initial message of all 0's from A through $2^s - 1$ B principals in repeated runs of the protocol, thus building a message consisting of all 1's, which he can send to C to cause the **SECRET** to be broadcast. It is easy to see that unless an exponential number of messages are sent, as long as A always uses 0 for all the x_i positions, the **SECRET** remains secret.

An interesting aspect of the protocol above is that it shows that a protocol can be secure against polynomial-time attack, but considered insecure under Dolev–Yao assumptions.

6.2. A class of undecidable protocols

We will generalize the exponential protocol used in the previous example by adding nonces to construct an undecidable protocol that uses small message size. First, we briefly review the Post correspondence problem.

A well known example of an undecidable problem is the *Post correspondence problem* (PCP) [57], which concerns simple manipulation of strings. This problem can be formally described (as in [63, p. 184]) as follows:

An instance of the PCP is a collection P of tiles:

$$P = \left\{ \left[\begin{array}{c} t_1 \\ b_1 \end{array} \right], \left[\begin{array}{c} t_2 \\ b_2 \end{array} \right], \dots, \left[\begin{array}{c} t_k \\ b_k \end{array} \right], \right\},$$

and a match is a sequence i_1, i_2, \dots, i_ℓ , where $t_{i_1} t_{i_2} \dots t_{i_\ell} = b_{i_1} b_{i_2} \dots b_{i_\ell}$. The problem is to determine whether P has a match. Let

$$\text{PCP} = \{ \langle P \rangle \mid P \text{ is an instance of the Post correspondence problem with a match} \}.$$

Table 12
Rules for path protocol

Keys: K – A 's session key; T, B – long term secrets shared by C, T_i
Constants: $\text{EOF}_T, \text{EOF}_B$ – indicate the end of a path
Tiles: $\begin{bmatrix} abc \\ bc \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} ac \\ cab \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} b \\ bca \end{bmatrix}, \dots$

$\begin{bmatrix} abc \\ bc \end{bmatrix}$	$A \longrightarrow T_1 :$	$\{t_1, b_1\}_K$
	$T_1 \longrightarrow A :$	$\{n_1, a, n_2\}_T, \{n_2, b, n_3\}_T, \{n_3, c, t_1\}_T,$ $\{n_4, b, n_5\}_B, \{n_5, c, b_1\}_B, \{n_1, n_4\}_K$
$\begin{bmatrix} ac \\ cab \end{bmatrix}$	$A \longrightarrow T_2 :$	$\{t_1, b_1\}_K$
	$T_2 \longrightarrow A :$	$\{n_1, a, n_2\}_T, \{n_2, c, t_1\}_T, \{n_3, c, n_4\}_B,$ $\{n_4, a, n_5\}_B, \{n_5, b, b_1\}_B, \{n_1, n_3\}_K$
$\begin{bmatrix} b \\ bca \end{bmatrix}$	$A \longrightarrow T_3 :$	$\{t_1, b_1\}_K$
	$T_3 \longrightarrow A :$	$\{n_1, b, t_1\}_T, \{n_2, b, n_3\}_B, \{n_3, c, n_4\}_B,$ $\{n_4, a, b_1\}_B, \{n_1, n_2\}_K$
...		

Checker:

$A \longrightarrow C :$	$\{t_1, b_1\}_K, \{t_1, X, t_2\}_T, \{b_1, X, b_2\}_B$
$C \longrightarrow A :$	$\{t_2, b_2\}_K$
$A \longrightarrow C :$	$\{t_1, b_1\}_K, \{t_1, X, \text{EOF}_T\}_T, \{b_1, X, \text{EOF}_B\}_B$
$C \longrightarrow A :$	SECRET

We define the *width* of a PCP instance as the length of the longest string in a tile. The *size* of a PCP instance is the number of tiles in P . PCP is undecidable for relatively small problem sizes. In particular, it has been proven to be undecidable for size 7 [48].

We propose a protocol that makes it possible to construct a “route” consisting of two strings, a “path” and a “return path”, by selecting from a set of sub-routes. Each sub-route (which we call a “tile”) will actually contain two parts, one for the forward path (which we call the “top”), and one for the return path (which we call the “bottom”). The intent is that the set of sub-route pieces (the set of tiles) has been chosen in such a way as to make it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to construct a sequence of tiles such that the top path and the bottom path are the same.

Table 12 shows an example of part of our proposed path protocol, for a particular set of tiles. The “Tiles” roles are used to build a complete route out of sub-route tiles. Each role adds its tile, one node at a time, to the front of the current route, building a linked list for the top and bottom paths. For an arbitrary set of tiles, the number of “Tiles” roles is equal to the number of tiles in the set, and the number of messages broadcast by each role corresponds to the width of the tiles.

The “Checker” roles are included to allow a designer to determine if they have selected a “good” set of sub-route tiles, by testing with a protocol analyzer to see if it is possible to create a route with identical forward and backward paths, using these tiles. The “Checker” protocol steps through the links in a route and broadcasts the message **SECRET** if all nodes on the top and bottom paths match (indicating an error).

In this example, we assume the values n_i are nonces, that K is a session key, and T and B are long term secrets used to encode the top and bottom paths, respectively (actually we use two different keys to serve the additional purpose of providing typing information to distinguish messages that are part of the top path from messages that are part of the bottom path – this typing information could be part of the message payload, and then one key would suffice). The constants EOF_T and EOF_B are used to mark the end of the path chain.

To build a path using the “Tiles” protocol, a client establishes a session key K , and then builds a path by contacting various T_i roles to add a tile to the path. An example of session using the tiles shown in Table 12 is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A &\longrightarrow T_1 : \{ \text{EOF}_T, \text{EOF}_B \}_K \\
 T_1 &\longrightarrow A : \{ n_1, \mathbf{a}, n_2 \}_T, \{ n_2, \mathbf{b}, n_3 \}_T, \{ n_3, \mathbf{c}, \text{EOF}_T \}_T, \\
 &\quad \{ n_4, \mathbf{b}, n_5 \}_B, \{ n_5, \mathbf{c}, \text{EOF}_B \}_B, \{ n_1, n_4 \}_K \\
 A &\longrightarrow T_2 : \{ n_1, n_4 \}_K \\
 T_2 &\longrightarrow A : \{ n_6, \mathbf{a}, n_7 \}_T, \{ n_7, \mathbf{c}, n_1 \}_T, \{ n_8, \mathbf{c}, n_9 \}_B, \\
 &\quad \{ n_9, \mathbf{a}, n_{10} \}_B, \{ n_{10}, \mathbf{b}, n_4 \}_B, \{ n_6, n_9 \}_K \\
 A &\longrightarrow T_1 : \{ n_6, n_9 \}_K \\
 T_1 &\longrightarrow A : \{ n_{11}, \mathbf{a}, n_{12} \}_T, \{ n_{12}, \mathbf{b}, n_{13} \}_T, \{ n_{13}, \mathbf{c}, n_6 \}_T, \\
 &\quad \{ n_{14}, \mathbf{b}, n_{15} \}_B, \{ n_{15}, \mathbf{c}, n_9 \}_B, \{ n_{11}, n_{14} \}_K
 \end{aligned}$$

This session, which uses the tiles in the order T_1, T_2, T_1 , builds a top path **abcacabc**, and a bottom path **bccabbc**.

We assume that the values EOF_T and EOF_B , as well as the nodes in the tile set, are public information. An intruder is able to attack the protocol and learn **SECRET** if he can construct a route where the top and bottom paths are identical, by selecting the tiles in the appropriate sequence, feeding messages into the protocol to build a route, and then feeding the route through the Checker protocol to cause it to broadcast **SECRET**. Note that selecting the set of tiles is equivalent to solving PCP, so the protocol is insecure if the intruder can solve PCP. In other words, since PCP is undecidable, the secrecy problem for this protocol class is undecidable.

Note that is also possible to construct a simple protocol using MSR that solves PCP, but uses arbitrary length messages. The point of our example here is that by using nonces we can construct a PCP solution using small messages, where the size of the messages depends on the size of the problem (i.e., the size of the tiles), not on the size of the problem solution.

7. Comparison to other work

The MSR formalism is based on earlier work first presented in [14,27,52]. The complexity results for undecidability and DEXP-completeness without a disequality test were first published in [26], with the NP-completeness results presented at the FMSP workshop talk in 1999. The complexity results with disequality test are presented here for the first time.

A complexity case that has been studied fairly extensively is the one with a bounded number of roles and an unbounded message size. This class is of interest because it seems to be practical to apply model-checking and exhaustive search techniques. This case was shown to be decidable in [37] and NP-complete (without restriction to atomic keys) in [60]. This work basically shows that the bounded nature of the protocols imposes its own natural limit on the message space that can be productively exploited by the attacker.

Additional work has also been done making use of the MSR formalism in areas other than complexity analysis. This includes relating strands [30] to MSR [15], and using MSR as a common intermediate language for CAPSL [24]. A typing infrastructure has been added to MSR, based on the theory of dependent types with subsorting [11], and this typed MSR was used to prove that the Dolev–Yao intruder can emulate the actions of an arbitrary adversary [10]. Recent work used MSR to formally analyze the Kerberos 5 protocol, discovering several anomalies [8].

8. Conclusion

In this paper we have defined the formalism for Multiset Rewriting with existentials, and shown how to use this formalism to describe security protocols and the Dolev–Yao attacker model. We use this formalism to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem in protocol analysis, under various restrictions to message size, number of protocol roles, and number of nonces.

Protocol analysis is theoretically hard, but many automated tools do exist that can provide useful insight into the problem. These tools usually are limited to some approximation of the protocol secrecy problem as we have defined it in this paper. For instance, tools such as model-checkers [45,50,53,59,61] limit the number of roles and nonces, other tools such as TAPS [20] ignore the linear nature (states) of the protocol roles. These tools can prove quite useful in identifying protocol bugs and possible attacks scenarios, though a model-checker can only prove there are no attacks within the limits of its search, and a non-linear model might discover spurious attacks that need to be examined and eliminated by hand. Symbolic tools like Athena [64] don't limit the number of roles, but also can't be guaranteed to terminate. In general, finding attacks in a limited case is easier than proving that there aren't any attacks in the general case.

We have identified an open problem for the complexity of the secrecy case with disequality, unbounded roles, and bounded nonces (the ??? box in Table 9). We conjecture that the additional power of the disequality test makes this case undecidable. Other future work in this area could include solving this open problem, as well as relating MSR to other protocol analysis formalisms such as spi calculus, and applying MSR to the analysis of specific protocols.

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Appendix A. Horn clause Turing machine reductions

A.1. Existential Horn clauses is undecidable

We use a construction based on axiomatizing a Cook’s-theorem-style Turing machine tableau, to prove the undecidability of existential Horn clauses. The notation we use here to encode a Turing machine is similar to that used in Section 2.4, though here we are representing an entire Turing machine tableau, and in Section 2.4 we were representing the step-by-step computation. Because the tableau is non-linear in nature, all facts that appear in the Horn clauses must be true at all times, so there are necessarily differences between the two encodings. For example, we cannot use the *Curr* predicate to represent the current state of the machine, because the intruder could replay an out-of-date fact at any time. Instead, the contents of the *Curr* predicate is included in the *Cont* predicate, which includes both the unique name of the cell in the tableau, and the cell’s contents.

We construct a tableau describing the computation of a DTM *M* on a given input $w \in \Sigma^*$, where $|w| = n$, using a set of existential Horn Clauses. An example of the tableau we construct is shown in Table 13. Also, a nice picture of a tableau similar to

Table 13
Example: Turing machine tableau

#	1.q ₀	1	...	0	□	□	#							
#	0	1.q ₁	...	0	□	□	□	#						
#	0.q ₂	0	...	0	□	□	□	□	#					
#	1	0	...	0	1.q	1	...	1	1	□	...	□	#	
#	1	0	...	0	0	1.q'	...	1	1	□	...	□	□	#

the one we use appears in [63, p. 255]. The atomic formula $A(b_1, \dots, b_k)$ mentioned in the statement of the lemma can be an atomic formula that is derivable by a rule that requires, in its hypothesis, that the Turing machine is in a halting state.

Take any language $A \subseteq \Sigma^*$. Let $M = \langle \Sigma, Q, \delta, q_0, Q^+ \rangle$ be a Deterministic Turing Machine (DTM). Here, Σ is a finite alphabet of tape symbols, containing the special blank symbol \square , Q is a finite set of states, $\delta : (Q \times \Sigma) \rightarrow \Sigma \times \{L, R\} \times Q$ is the transition relation, $q_0 \in Q$ is the initial state, and $Q^+ \subseteq Q$ is the set of accepting states. Without loss of generality, we assume a Turing machine with a semi-infinite tape that guarantees the head will not run off the left end of the tape, and we assume that every accepting state is a terminal state.

We construct a set of Horn Clauses $H(M, w)$ as follows:

Notation. First we define three predicates that describe the contents of the cells in the tableau, and their relationship to each other.

Cont(x, a, q) Cell x has contents a . If present, q means the tape head is in cell x and the machine is in state q .
Adj(x, y) Cell x is adjacent to cell y .
Below(x, y) Cell y is below cell x .

We introduce some special constants. c_{eot} is a special cell name that labels the cell at the right end of the tape on each row of the tableau. The symbol $@ \notin Q$ is a placeholder for the machine state in those cells that don't contain the tape head. The symbol $\# \notin \Sigma$ is used as the contents for the cells at both ends of the tape.

Transition clauses. For each transition relation in δ , we introduce a clause. For a transition that moves the tape head to the left, $\delta(q_i, s) = \{(q_j, s', L)\}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x, y, z, a, b. [(\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Adj}(y, z) \wedge \\ & \text{Cont}(x, a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y, s, q_i) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, b, @)) \\ & \implies \exists x', y', z'. ((\text{Adj}(x', y') \wedge \text{Adj}(y', z')) \wedge \\ & \text{Below}(x, x') \wedge \text{Below}(y, y') \wedge \text{Below}(z, z')) \wedge \\ & \text{Cont}(x', a, q_j) \wedge \text{Cont}(y', s', @) \wedge \text{Cont}(z', b, @)] \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for a transition that moves the tape head to the right, $\delta(q_i, s) = \{(q_j, s', R)\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x, y, z, a, b. [(\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Adj}(y, z) \wedge \\ & \text{Cont}(x, a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y, s, q_i) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, b, @)) \\ & \implies \exists x', y', z'. ((\text{Adj}(x', y') \wedge \text{Adj}(y', z')) \wedge \\ & \text{Below}(x, x') \wedge \text{Below}(y, y') \wedge \text{Below}(z, z')) \wedge \\ & \text{Cont}(x', a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y', s', @) \wedge \text{Cont}(z', b, q_j)] \end{aligned}$$

Maintenance clauses. In addition to the transition clauses, we need several other clauses that are used to construct the rest of the tableau that is not near the tape head.

This clause copies the contents of the tape to the next row in the tableau, creating a new cell below the old one, provided the cell and its neighbors do not contain the tape head.

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x, y, z, a, b, c. [(\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Adj}(y, z)) \wedge \\ & \text{Cont}(x, a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y, b, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, c, @)] \\ & \implies \exists y'. (\text{Below}(y, y') \wedge \text{Cont}(y', b, @)) \end{aligned}$$

There is a tape maintenance clause for adding a new cell at the right end of the tape at each step:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x, y, a. [\text{Adj}(x, c_{\text{eot}}) \wedge \text{Below}(x, y) \\ & \implies \exists z. \text{Adj}(y, z) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, \square, @) \wedge \text{Adj}(z, c_{\text{eot}})] \end{aligned}$$

This rule ensures that the computation can never run off the right end of the tape, since the tape head starts at the leftmost cell, each step can only move the tape head to the right by at most one, and this rule creates a new cell at each step. So at the m 'th step of the computation, there are always at least $m + n$ cells in the tape. The right end of the actual tape is infinite, but our tableau only needs to represent a finite number of cells on each row, with the rest of the cells to the right assumed to contain \square .

Another special maintenance clause is needed to allow the left marker cell to be copied down to each successive row of the tableau:

$$\forall x, y, a. [\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Cont}(x, \#, @) \implies \exists z. \text{Below}(x, z) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, \#, @)]$$

Finally, we need a way to connect together the cells created by the above rules. This clause generates the adjacency facts for cells that are below adjacent cells.

$$\forall x, y, x', y'. [\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Below}(x, x') \wedge \text{Below}(y, y') \implies \text{Adj}(x', y')]$$

Initialization. The initial state of the DTM has the input $w = w_1 w_2 \dots w_n$ in the first n cells of the tape, with the rest of the infinite tape containing \square , the tape head in the first cell, and the machine state q_0 . In our construction we assign the cells in the first row the names $c_0, c_1, \dots, c_n, c_{n+1}, c_{n+2}$, and we include some special marker cells at the ends of the active region of the tape.

We represent the top row of the tableau by describing the adjacency of the cells, and their contents, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ \text{Adj}(c_0, c_1), \text{Adj}(c_1, c_2), \dots, \\ & \quad \text{Adj}(c_n, c_{n+1}), \text{Adj}(c_{n+1}, c_{n+2}), \text{Adj}(c_{n+2}, c_{\text{eot}}), \\ & \text{Cont}(c_0, \#, @), \text{Cont}(c_1, w_1, q_0), \text{Cont}(c_2, w_2, @), \dots, \\ & \quad \text{Cont}(c_n, w_n, @), \text{Cont}(c_{n+1}, \square, @), \text{Cont}(c_{n+2}, \square, @), \text{Cont}(c_{\text{eot}}, \#, @) \} \end{aligned}$$

Note: The 2 extra blank cells after the input are provided to ensure correct operation of the construction on an input of $w = \varepsilon$.

Termination. The acceptance condition is represented by a set of clauses that derive the **ACCEPT** fact:

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall x, a. [\text{Cont}(x, a, q_{a1}) \implies \text{ACCEPT} \\ &\text{Cont}(x, a, q_{a2}) \implies \text{ACCEPT} \\ &\dots] \end{aligned}$$

for each $q_{ai} \in Q^+$.

Lemma A.1. $H(M, w) \vdash \text{ACCEPT}$ if and only if machine M halts in an accepting state on input string w .

Proof. We first show that if machine M halts in an accepting state on input string w , then $H(M, w) \vdash \text{ACCEPT}$. The accepting computation of M can be represented by an accepting tableau, as described earlier and illustrated in Table 13, where each line of the tableau corresponds to a configuration of the accepting computation. If M halts in an accepting state on input string w after f steps, that means there is a sequence of configurations c_0, c_1, \dots, c_f , such that c_0 is the initial configuration (i.e., the top line of the tableau), c_f is a configuration with the state $q_f \in Q^+$, and for each consecutive configuration c_i, c_{i+1} , c_{i+1} can be obtained from c_i by applying some rule δ_i from δ .

By construction, the Initialization clauses ensure that initial Horn clauses in $H(M, w)$ correspond to configuration c_0 . If a state corresponding to configuration c_i can be reached by applying clauses in $H(M, w)$, then the state corresponding to c_{i+1} can be reached by applying the Transition clause that corresponds to the rule δ_i , plus the Maintenance clauses. The Transition clause builds the cells near the tape head, and the Maintenance clauses build the other cells in the configuration, and ensure that they are connected together properly. These clauses together can be used to construction a state that corresponds to configuration c_{i+1} . Finally, when configuration c_f is reached in the Turing machine tableau, $\text{Cont}(x, a, q_f)$ will be true for some cell x , so the Termination clause can be applied to derive **ACCEPT** from $H(M, w)$.

Now we show that if $H(M, w) \vdash \text{ACCEPT}$, then machine M halts in an accepting state on input string w . If $H(M, w) \vdash \text{ACCEPT}$, then $\text{Cont}(x, a, q_f)$ must be derivable for some cell x and some state $q_f \in Q^+$. By construction, the initial Horn clauses in $H(M, w)$ correspond to the Turing machine's initial configuration, c_0 . Only the Termination clauses can be used to derive **ACCEPT**, and only the Transition clauses can be used to create new cells whose contents contain the tape head (and thus the machine state). So the sequence of transition clauses used to derive **ACCEPT** corresponds exactly to the sequence of transition rules in δ that are used in the accepting computation of M . \square

A cell position is a pair of numbers, with each number represented by a sequence of bits. For conciseness, we use the following abbreviations:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Cont}(p, a, q) &\equiv \text{Cont}(\langle n, m \rangle, a, q) \\ \text{Cont}(\langle n, m \rangle, a, q) &\equiv \text{Cont}(\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle, a, q) \\ \text{Cont}(\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle, a, q) &\equiv \text{Cont}(x_0, \dots, x_{n^\ell}, y_0, \dots, y_{n^\ell}, a, q)\end{aligned}$$

where p is any position $\langle n, m \rangle$ and n and m are the numbers represented by the bit vectors \vec{x} and \vec{y} . We use similar abbreviations for the cell numbers in the **Adj** and **Below** predicates.

Transition Clauses. For each transition relation in δ , we introduce a clause. For a transition that moves the tape head to the left, $\delta(q_i, s) = \{(q_j, s', L)\}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x, x', y, y', z, z', a, b. [&(\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Adj}(y, z) \wedge \\ &\text{Cont}(x, a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y, s, q_i) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, b, @)) \wedge \\ &\text{Below}(x, x') \wedge \text{Below}(y, y') \wedge \text{Below}(z, z') \\ \implies &\text{Cont}(x', a, q_j) \wedge \text{Cont}(y', s', @) \wedge \text{Cont}(z', b, @)]\end{aligned}$$

And similarly for a transition that moves the tape head to the right.

Maintenance clauses. This clause copies the contents of the tape to the next row in the tableau, provided the cell and its neighbors do not contain the tape head.

$$\begin{aligned}\forall x, x', y, y', z, z', a, b, c. [&(\text{Adj}(x, y) \wedge \text{Adj}(y, z) \wedge \\ &\text{Cont}(x, a, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(y, b, @) \wedge \text{Cont}(z, c, @)) \wedge \text{Below}(y, y') \\ \implies &\text{Cont}(y', b, @)]\end{aligned}$$

This clause copies the contents of the marker cells (which will be initialized to be the left and right margins of the first row) to the cells below.

$$\forall x, y. [(\text{Below}(x, y) \wedge \text{Cont}(x, \#, @)) \implies \text{Cont}(y, \#, @)]$$

Initialization. As for the unbounded Turing machine, the initial state of the DTM has the input $w = w_1 w_2 \dots w_n$ in the first n cells of the tape, with the rest of the infinite tape containing \square , the tape head in the first cell, and the machine state q_0 . As described above, we use symbolic tape cell names of the form $\langle x, y \rangle$, to label the cells. We also include some special marker cells at the ends of the tape.

We represent the top row of the tableau by describing the initial contents of the tape, with the input word first, and the rest of the tape row containing blanks.

$$\{\text{Cont}(\langle 1, 0 \rangle, w_1, q_0), \text{Cont}(\langle 2, 0 \rangle, w_2, @), \dots, \text{Cont}(\langle n, 0 \rangle, w_n, @)\}$$

and

$$\{\text{Cont}(\langle n+1, 0 \rangle, \square, @), \text{Cont}(\langle n+2, 0 \rangle, \square, @), \dots, \text{Cont}(\langle 2^{n^k} - 1, 0 \rangle, \square, @)\}$$

We use a set of $n^\ell + 1$ adjacency facts to describe the horizontal connections between the cells in the tableau. Here we use the notation 1^n to indicate a string of n 1's, and 0^n to indicate a string of n 0's.

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Adj}(\langle \vec{x}0, \vec{y} \rangle, \langle \vec{x}1, \vec{y} \rangle)] \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Adj}(\langle \vec{x}01, \vec{y} \rangle, \langle \vec{x}10, \vec{y} \rangle)] \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Adj}(\langle \vec{x}011, \vec{y} \rangle, \langle \vec{x}100, \vec{y} \rangle)] \\ & \dots \\ & \forall \vec{y}. [\text{Adj}(\langle 01^{n^\ell}, \vec{y} \rangle, \langle 10^{n^\ell}, \vec{y} \rangle)] \\ & \} \end{aligned}$$

And we need a set of $n^\ell + 1$ belowness facts to describe the vertical connections between the cells.

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Below}(\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}0 \rangle, \langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}1 \rangle)] \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Below}(\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}01 \rangle, \langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}10 \rangle)] \\ & \forall \vec{x}, \vec{y}. [\text{Below}(\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}011 \rangle, \langle \vec{x}, \vec{y}100 \rangle)] \\ & \dots \\ & \forall \vec{x}. [\text{Below}(\langle \vec{x}, 01^{n^\ell} \rangle, \langle \vec{x}, 10^{n^\ell} \rangle)] \\ & \} \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we need to initialize the contents of the special marker cells on the two ends of the tape, the left margin and right margin of the first row:

$$\{\text{Cont}(\langle 0, 0 \rangle, \#, @), \text{Cont}(\langle 2^{n^\ell}, 0 \rangle, \#, @)\}$$

Termination. The acceptance condition is represented by a set of clauses that derive the ACCEPT fact:

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall x, a. [\text{Cont}(x, a, q_{a1}) \implies \text{ACCEPT} \\ & \text{Cont}(x, a, q_{a2}) \implies \text{ACCEPT} \\ & \dots] \end{aligned}$$

Lemma A.3. $H(M, w, N) \vdash \text{ACCEPT}$ if and only if machine M accepts the input string w of length n within $N = 2^{n^\ell}$ steps.

Proof. This follows from an argument similar to Lemma A.1, though the cells are named symbolically using constants, and the Turing machine tableau is slightly different, as described above, and illustrated in Table 14. \square

Lemma A.4. *The implication problem for Horn clauses without function symbols or existentials is in DEXP-hard. In particular, an algorithm for deciding whether a set of existential Horn clauses without function symbols implies a single atomic formula $A(b_1, \dots, b_k)$ without function symbols, variables or existentials runs in time exponential in the size of the input formula.*

Proof. This follows from Lemma A.3. Since we can reduce the decision problem for a DEXP-time Turing machine to the implication problem for Horn clauses without existentials or function symbols, the implication problem is DEXP-hard. \square

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