This is an article saved from Usenet, back before there were any Usenet archives (like Deja or Google Groups). If I can find the archives for this thread, I may remove this page. I’ve found parts of it here[1] (archived here[2]) but not all of it.
From: drmweaver2@aol.com (DrmWeaver2)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.games
Subject: Strategy and Tactics - An Intelligence Analyst's Perspective
Date: 17 May 1996 07:27:21 -0400
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
Way back in Mar sunir shah (re-)posted That Heirarchal AI Essay for Chris
Orchard from andrew@cs.uct.ac.za (Andrew Luppnow) (might have originally
been posted sometime around/in Dec 94(??)
Part 1 (of who knows how many parts)
A couple of thoughts of my own on the subject (as a former military
officer/military intelligence analyst):
1. I pretty much agree that generals do not know or care about the
locations or strengths of individual soldiers on a battlefield. However,
he looks at and moves entire units as if they were individual pieces.
Depending on the rank of the general, the pieces may be (traditionally)
either Army, Corps, or Division size (or Front/Theater size in extreme
cases).
2. Likewise, Colonels generally "play" with Battalion, Brigade, or
Regiment size pieces while Captains play with Companies - or in a modern
world Teams (larger than Companies but smaller than Battalions. Looney
tune Lieutenants get to play with Platoons and special weapons, serageants
with squads and individual soldiers.
3. Strategy and tactics are synonyms on different scales. Strategy may or
may not include political considerations in addition to geo-political
boundaries, alliances, personalities of enemy leaders, doctrinal use of
specific tactics, use/non-use of special weapons based on
moral/ethical/cultural/religous grounds, expected timing, location, and
strength(s) of reinforcement(s), and other non-tactical items. Tactics
generally scales the above considerations down - for instance, substitute
geographic features for geo-political boundaries; making use of enemy
weaponry on the immediate level of a battlefield vice passing a captured
nuclear weapon up to Front level authorities (who may have to obtain
political approval before being authorized to use such a weapon); asking a
captured soldier about the food status of his squad vice receiving/using
the same information from 1000 captured soldiers from different parts of a
battlefield. Basically, it's a question of scale.
4. So, a politician sets the goals for a military operation, allocates
the resources (including the miltary-industrial complex for manufacturing
replacements) to accomplish these goals to the general, provides
information from and constructs alliances to support the operation,
provides monetary support to pay (for) to the military members, and does
all this within the confines of his cultural experience.
5. The General (at the highest level) then analyzes the goal(s) assigned,
the resources available, the threats (real and perceived) to his forces,
avenues of approach to geographic military objectives, possible defensive
measures the enemy might use to obfusticate friendly forces, intelligence
gathering assets and own-force assessments of opposing force positions -
tactics - strengths - alliances, and tells the politician whether he can
or cannot succeed in accomplishing the assigned goal(s).
6. Negotiation between the politician and the general ensues and a happy
medium is reached (or another general is found who will bow to the will of
the politician). "I can run wild in the Pacific for six months.. .. after
that, .. ..?" - Admiral Yamamoto, Imperial Japanese Fleet prior to World
War II. Major doctrinal ideologies are also negotiated - no nukes/nukes
only in retaliation/freedom to use at commander discretion, etc - and
decided upon.
7. Once the goal(s) is/are decided on, the general then finalizes the
"strategy" (there's that word again) to be used. He does this through
assignment of specific sub-goals to specific commanders with specific
forces. He may or may not retain some forces, weapons, intelligence
assets, even certain intelligence information for himself and not
disseminate such to subordinate commanders. He paints a picture on the
battlefield, through the deployment of his forces, how he wants the battle
to progress. In doing so, he attempts to force the enemy to respond in a
way advantageous to his (the General's) friendly force goals and
disadvantageously to the enemy's goals (generally the prevention of the
attainment of those goals by the General's forces).
8. Each commander down the line acts as the General has - analyzing,
assigning forces, deploying, and conducting the battle at his own level of
playing piece.
9. Even before any move has been actually made by the General, an enemy
can be expected to react. But, first action by the General's forces must
be detected. Seems obvious doesn't it? But, it's often overlooked - even
by military historians, yes, even by modern day commanders. Ex., The US
Navy itself wrote a report detailing the tactics which the Japanese used
to attack Pearl Harbor some years before the actual attack. The morning
of the attack, a radar station detected and attempted to report the first
wave of attacking bombers but was ignored by higher command. So, the
first "detection" of enemy action was someone observing bombs actually
dropping on Pearl. So much for intelligence IN the military! So,
"action" could be identified/defined as any of the following in the
"prelude to battle" phase:
a. Positioning of forces within own political boundaries
b. Increased/cessation of training
c. Specialized training
d. Increased communication/decreased communnication
e. Movement of national command authorities to safe havens
f. Non-routine/scheduled visits by commanders to non-headquarters units
g. Cancellation of leaves/vacations
h. Stocking logistical supplies (weapons, stores, transportation,
fuels)
i. Implementing non-routine controls on civilian populace
j. Communications between entities not normally in communication with
each other
k. Increasing intelligence gathering activities
l. Mobilzing national reserve forces
m. Placing restrictions on mass media (TV, radio, etc.)
10. Sensing any ation which is not routine, the enemy
politician(s)/commander may make moves of his own, including actions which
are listed in 9 above, or:
a. Increasing political activity - strengthening alliances
b. Severing other alliances
c. Obtaining/reminding existing allies of promised support in the event
of hostilities
d. Threatening the opposing force with political or military action in
retaliation/response to the perceived threat
e. Strengthening defensive positions, barriers, existing obstacles
f. Developing new weapons in response to specific tactics expected
g. Mobilizing the industirla complex/nationalizing the econoy in
preparation for a decrease in the production of consumer goods in favor of
increased production of military goods
h. Attempting the assassination/discrediting/dishonoring of key members
of the opposing force national command structure/key political figures/key
military figures
i. Taking hostages in advance/moving foreign nationals to the vicinity
of locations/facilities expected to be targets of attacks by foreign
forces
j. Attempting to obscure the actual locations of troops, the actual
strengths of units, the locations of supply/logistics points
k. Reorganizing from a peace-time to a war-time/streamlined command
structure
l. Conducting high-level commander/staff-oriented exercises (wargaming)
m. Publicly declaring that increased levels of preparedness for defense
have been implemented
So, now we actually get to a "move" being made - everything prior usually
being "assumed" or delineated in the game's instructions/design/or set up
as the basis for the game.
Part 3
So, now we actually get to a "move" being made - everything prior usually
being "assumed" or delineated in the game's instructions/design/or set up
as the basis for the game.
11. The General issues his orders, the Colonel receives those orders,
breaks them up/down and issues his own, and at this point, we generally
transition from "grand strategy" to tactical/local considerations. Think
about it for a moment - to a General, that blue line on his map may be
only a somewhat unimpressive geographic feature, but to the 2nd Lieutenant
and his men attempting to swim across a swollen river in freezing
temperatures due to lack of wood, the same wide-wet son of a gun is
certainly important/impressive. On the other hand, faced with an enemy
tank without supporting infantry (in an urban environment with rubble on
the streets), two grenades, a shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon, 2 machine
guns, 1 machine pistol, a radio connection to a Forward Air Controller, a
radio link with Division/Battalion Field Artillery, and 3 non-ambulatory
soldiers, the Lieutenant has only one realistic tactic despite the variety
of resources available to him. Unless that single tank is stopping an
advance that the General has planned - ex., sitting at a crucial crossroad
- he probably isn't even aware of the tank being there.
12. So, let's look at the tactical considerations:
a. Terrain - affects cover for individual troops, radio/visual line of
sight, radio/ visual communication range, rates of movement for
troops/vehicles, location(s) of supply points, ability to set up specific
defenses - its hard to "dig in" when on a treeless, smooth rock
outcropping.
b. Strength(s) of friendly forces - not only number of troops and their
equipment, but also the ability to concentrate forces(power) at a specific
point for a relatively short period of time in order to attain a desired
outcome (ex., pinning down specific enemy troops, making a "breakthrough",
seizing a particular landmark, etc).
c. Logistics - how much ammo does each troop have, what is his firing
rate/rate of expenditure in battle, how long can this rate of usage be
sustained without being resupplied (usually this point is simplified in
board level wargames except at Squad/Company level games), how are supply
"pieces"/units themselves resupplied, what is the effect of losing a
supply unit (can another existing unit perform the supply/resupply
function thoguh with a penalty in effectiveness, are alternate means of
supply already planned/available, how does a loss of communication
(radios/landlines/road hexes) affect the supply line.
d. Intelligence - usually a Lieutenant doesn't need to involve himself in
the really big picture, or the fact that his own forces know that a new
fighter aricraft type has been seen being rolled out of a design bureau's
experimental aircraft plant, or that the French have declared war on the
German's (again) when he's stuck in a foxhole in Ethiopia. When enemy
artillery rounds are impacting within 500 yards of his foxhole, few people
really care that this is "for God and Country" or that holding this piece
of (urine spattered) ground is part of the General's master plan!
However, some intelligence is pertinent to the Lieutenant. If higher
headquarters tells him that the unit on the opposite side of a river is
almost out of ammunition according to radio intercepts, or that the enemy
platoon leader and sergeants were critically wounded in the last skirmish
(from the interrogation of a captured soldier), or that the enemy troops
are actually all sixteen year old bos and men over sixty years old (as
often happened in the last days of final assault on Germany in WWII) -
those types of information are definitely useful and can affect how the
LT. deploys his troops, how much reconnaissance he feels he needs to
attempt a river crossing, maybe when he actually times his attack, whether
he asks for supporting fire form artillery/aircraft, etc.
e. Formations - Offensive. These can be:
1) Road March - low attack, low defense, high rate of movement, it takes
time to deploy a unit in road march to another formation (some nations
practice such deployments routinely while other nations have no experience
which such rapid deployment), medium-low control by local commander,
little or no control by higher hq.
2) Cautious Advance - high attack, high-medium defense, low-medium rate
of movement, excellent control by local commander, less control by higher
hq.
3) Advance to contact - high attack, medium defense, medium rate of
movement, excellent-medium control by local commander, good-low control by
higher hq.
4) Reconnaissance - low attack, low defense, high rate of movement, low
control by local or higher hq.
5) Deliberate attack - very high attack, medium-low defense, medium rate
of movement, good control by local commander, less control by higher hq.
6) Hasty Ambush - good attack, average defense, mediocre control locally,
poor control by higher hq.
7) Deliberate Ambush - excellent short range attack/piss-poor long range
attack (unless equipped with special/long-range weapons), excellent
control locally, good control by higher hq.
Part 4
f. Formations - Defensive. These can be:
1) Dug-in - none-minimal attack, maximum defense, no movement (max 1 hex
in any event - probably makes more sense to make it take "a turn" to
change formation before allowing any movmeent by a dug-in unit), excellent
control locally, excellant control by higher hq.
2) Deliberate defense - minimal attack, excellent defense, slow movement,
good-excellent local control, good control by higher ups.
3) Hasty Defense - just less than average attack, mediocre defense, less
than good control either locally or by higher hq.
4) Retreat - no attack, less than mediocre defense (tho' there have been
some epic defensive retreats in history - ex., the Marines withdrawal
during the Korean War), average movement, low control - locally or by
higher ups.
5) Routed - this is a retreat which has gotten out of hand. All control
has been lost by commanders, and consequently no attack can be made by
this unit. Actually, nothing can be done by this unit except to
Reorganize (below).
6) Constructing/Improving defensive position - no attack, less than
good/better than average defense, good control locally, little control by
higher hq.
g. Formations - Other. These can be:
1) Reorganization - no attack, defense, or control by any one. This is
strictly an administrative deployment allowing restocking of personnel,
equipment, weaponry, sometimes training, and resting the battle weary. If
anything should happen to this unit - ie., if it comes under attack while
in Reorganization - it is destroyed. This should take no less than two
turns.
2) Training - low attack, high defense, low control locally, low control
by higher ups. Except for elite units, this is basically a step above
reorganization but not as high as either hasty defense or road march.
3) Resupplying - no attack, good-poor defense (depends upon how far along
in the resupply seuence a unit is), low control - either locally or by
higher ups.
4) Dispersed - no attack, low defense, low control either locally or by
higher hq.
5) Special - could vary with type of unit/terrain/situtation. Ex.,
mountain infantry in snowy mountainous terrain, or SEAL units on a sandy
beach, or paratroop units in the air/just after they hit the ground
(actually they probably should be in a Reorganize mode/formation for a
turn - except for defensive value(?))
h. Once an (any) order is given and sub-units/soldiers begin to carry out
the order, some control is lost by the leader. This cannot be avoided -
out of "sight" of the leader, sub-units are under local control
immediately - this can mean that an individual soldier is out of control
within seconds of receiving an order. Ex., Order - "Take the Hill",
Result - Soldier A charges up the hill, Soldier B walks up, Soldier C
freezes, Soldier D dies from withering gunfire as he turns to carry out
the order. See - c*h*a*o*s, then again, this is a battle, isn't it?
i. The commander's role is self-preservation along with establishing and
maintaining communication with each sub-unit (some at different
frequencies than with other sub-units [may depend upon role/distance from
commander]) for the purposes of: establishing how the battle is
progressing/that is, how the commander's orders are being carried out (is
an attack looking successful or bad, are units being decimated -
regardless of formation, whether or not friendly intelligence was valid or
if the "intell weenies" were just plain out to lunch. Also of importance
is whether sub-unit commanders are surviving, whether specific commanders
are consistent at carrying out orders rapidly, efficiently, and without
question or whether they seem to wander, delay, and sometimes flat out
refuse. (An uncomfortable theoretical: "Attack any survivors in the
radiated zone {after a dirty/low-yield, tactical nuclear explosion";
result could be "!#$!# you, sir. You go do it - I cover myself double when
getting x-rayed!" This would be an understandable response to a civilian
but could not be tolerated in the military.)
j. As feedback comes to the attention of the local commander, one of his
duties is to pass the situation as he sees it up the chain of command. At
each successively higher level, the "picture" of the battlefield is
determined by "fusing" these friendly commander reports with intelligence
gathered by special units. Failure to fuse often results in warped
pictures of the situation being presented to the commander. Remember that
the commander makes each subsequent order at aperiodic rates based on his
own perceptions and ability to weigh all the variables involved in
"situational awareness". Each battle is different and requires adjusting
to unexpected events - both the good and the bad. Imagine General Patton
hesitating to order his troops across an abandoned but intact bridge when
crossing the Rhine. He'd have been relieved on the spot! In the real
world, some commanders use what is known as intuition in deciding whether
or not to pursue an unexpected opening in the enemy's defenses; other
commanders are more deliberate. Each approach has its advantages and its
disadvantages. Rash and aggressive commanders have often had their units
demolished/destroyed when they imprudently acted over-aggressively. Other
commanders have been relieved or damaged their reputations for not
respnding to openings presented ("obviously" to other commanders) by the
enemy - but their troops survived. It's a teetertotter and a gamble. How
much information does a particular commander require to make an
intelligent decision in any given situation? There is absolutely NO way
to tell/predict. But, specific "genes" programmed into AI commanders coud
cause one commader to act more aggressively than another, to weigh
intellligence more heavily than friendly force reports, to always ask for
more support (like General Montgomery of the British), to give general
orders rather than specific ones - allowing freedom to sub-unit
commanders.
Part 5
k. Let's back up now to the General/Strategic level and delve into one of
my favorite subjects: Intelligence agthering, analysis and the intellignt
use thereof (please excuse the pun). Intelligence sources include:
1) Friendly force reconnaissance. Friendly trops are sent to specific
locations to "see what they can see", hear what there is to hear, etc. and
then to report to their commanders what it is they have seen/heard. These
units do little or no "fusing" or their observations with
reports/observations from other friendly sources. They are strictly "see
and report" units with normally minimal attack and efense values.
2) Special Intelligence units. These units include the following:
A) Interrogation. Linguists who ask questions (often accompanied with
torture - oooh, mmovie thriller/action adventure time) of captured
soldiers and report what the captured dudes said. They are trained
investigators who rely on experience in their craft to perform on the spot
evaluations of the validity and truth of the statements of the
interrogated. They may have a specific purpose in individual
interrogations - like verifying something someone else said, establishing
the presence on the battlefield of a new weapon, determining the effect of
psyops work by friendly forces, etc.
B) Radio listening stations. These units scan the electro-magnetic ether
searching for transmissions by enemy units looking for conversations which
include orders, unit locations, supply status, plans, etc. Anything that
can be useful is listened for. Because of the use of language(s) not the
same as that of friendly forces, linguists are often used in these units.
Analysts collate the raw data captured by (heard) by the "listeners" and
perform 1st echelon analysis - often drawing relationship diagrams of:
frequency usage, transmission times between specific stations, who talks
to whom, whether coeded messages are used, whether the same voice is
always heard when a specific callsign is used or not, which units seem to
respond to which other units (if station A talks to station B and then B
moves, then later A talks to both B and C and both move; one may assume
that station A is superior to both B and C). These lsitening stations may
listen for voice, radio teletype, cellular telephone, fascimile (fax)
transmissions, tap regular telephone lines, and other truly specialized
transmissions. These specialized transmissions might include satellite
up/down links (look at hobbyist HAM radio transmissions for instance), any
thing that "radiates" electromagnetic energy can theoretically be
"captured"/heard by other-than-intended recipients without either the
originator or the intended/authorized recipients being any the wiser,
traditional geographic location beacons (ex., at airports, LORAN stations,
WWV/WWVH), television stations, etc. Purely theorectically, radar
stations could be plotted - whether traditional airport style radars or
weather related radars. By simply plotting the movements and radiation
patterns of/used by specific transmitters one might be able relate these
transmissions and movements to the strategic plans, goals, or movements by
the opposing General and his forces. Ex., if US/Allied forces had been
able to be "tracked" because of radio transmissions they made while they
were performing their "end run", the Iraqis could have had a nasty
surprise, say the Revolutionary Guards, waiting for the "end-runners" - or
had a specific area targetted for destruction by Scuds (imagine, unit A
moves into grid square xxxyyy and spotters relay this to artilery
unit/Scud XYZ who then launches about twenty or thirty of those bad boys
onto the unsuspecting/ but soon-to-be-dead troops).
C) Electronic Warfare Units/Jammers. These guys' purpose in life is to
deny the use of the radio or other means of communications to the enemy.
They generally do this by overpowering enemy transmissions - say radiating
100kw power on a frequency the enemy uses (when he's only transitting
15w). Other things these guys are food at include "spoofing" or imitating
the enemy - "This is your (the enemy) General speaking. Cease hostilities.
Cease fire. Cease fire." They generally target either specific
transmitters or specific frequencies. This is important because if
jamming is used indiscriminately and injudiciously you could deny your own
forces the ability to communicate with each other. You could even draw
the attention of "counter-battery" artillery (generally used to describe
artillery which is used to fire back at enemy artillery units). Imagine
keying the transmitter to jam someone and you get an explosive airborne
special delivery; so you cease transmission and the "incomings" stop; then
you key the mike again and, voila, special delivery - cease transmission,
it stops; and this continues. I think that I might be persuaded to quit
jamming after a few rounds landed on top of my position - at the least, it
would interrupt my transmission plans while I repaired the damaged to my
antennas and other equipment.
D) Early warning radar stations. These guys attempt to detect the
incoming missiles and airplane attacks of the bad guys - often at ranges
"beyond the visual horizon" - hundreds, even thousands, of miles away.
Both active radiation and passively sitting and listening for enemy radars
are used.
E) Long-range sonar sations. Like radar stations, these guys attempt to
detect incoming attacks or movements or troops - but they do it simpy by
traditional sonar techniques.
F) Acoustic sensor units. Ever heard the whop-whop-whop of a helicopter
overhead, or the roar of a jet. Guess what? Some units use "big-ear
devices just to do that. In Vietnam, for instance, artillery was used to
"deliver" acoustic sensors to locations behind the N. Vietnamese lines;
these sensors had radio transmitters linked back to the acoustic plotters;
after plotting the locations of the sensors, the acoustic unit could then
track sounds and their movements by plotting the times and strengths
(loudness) of sounds at specific sensors. Given enough time one could
also "catalog" the sounds in a given environment (like was referred to in
the movie Hunt for Red October - "Sir, this sounds like a magma
displacment at nrmal speed, but if I change the playback speed to 10x, it
sounds mechanical. I think it's a sub!").
G) Airborne intelligence units. These include planes which are
photorecon units, radio listening planes, special radar units, and
sometimes, they do things like drop lealets in a psychological operations
mission. This type of unit has been in use since the earliest days of air
warfare - yup, even back in cloth biplane days.
H) Satellites. In today's modern technological world, satellites can be
used as semi-permanent "eyes-in-the-sky". Many different types of sensors
(radios, radars, photograhs, temperature sensors, magnetic field
detectors) can be mounted on satellites and various trajectories for
satellites can be used to ensure that the "platform" provides the intended
coverage. This coverage could be repeated-every-once-in-a-while (with
elliptical or eccentric orbital patterns) or constant (with geo-stationary
orbits). A popular magazine, Jane's Defense Weekly, has reported that
some photographic sensors are sophisticated enough to allow one to read a
Moscow newspaper from orbit. Commercial weather satellite pictures
provide some idea of the usefulness of photographic satellites - use a
bigger lens and one should be able to actually watch the movementsx of
ships (or troops) at sea, examine the harbors of the world to see if
certain ships are where human observers report they are.
I) Humans. These are the spy guys. They do a bit of everything -all the
cloak and dagger stuff of so many novels. They sneak into places which
are secret, take pictures of new discoveries, report on troop movements,
attempt assassinations, etc. But, a lot of the time they do more mundane
things like read newspapers and report what the enemy tells its own
people, report what is being said (allowed to be said) on the radio/TV,
report the effect of war on the morale of the populace, and report the
effect of air attacks on cities - industrial and population. In the
modern world, today's spies can be found using satellite comm links,
microdots, diplomatic mail pouches, and other means to relay their reports
to their superiors. The key is to get the information back to someone who
can make use of it.
Part 6.A.
How does the Intelligence Analyst Analyze?
The Intelligence Analyst has the job of taking information from diverse
sources (see Part 5) and merging it into a single (hopefully) coherent
picture. This picture can be a very focused picture which limits itself
to a specific time period (say the next few hors or the next two weeks), a
specific geographic region/location (say the area in front of 1/141 FA Bn
of the 4th Mech Inf Div or the European Theater in World War II) , a
specific unit or person (ex., SEAL Team 6 or Winston Churchill's
mistress), or a specific technology or technological development (ex., the
use of canards on aircraft or the new MIG-29). It could be a less focused
report on a general topic - "I think the overall goal of the enemy is not
the destruction of troops per se, but to establish respect and fear from
its political neighbors - and if they gain some territory in the bargain,
great", the relationship between the political leaders in a target
country, the increasing use and availability of former-Soviet/now-Russian
weaponry in Third World countries, the influence of the effectivenss of
Allied tactics during Desert Storm in Third World Armies, etc.
So, the first thing the Intelligence Analyst (IA) does is to determine
what his commander wants to hear about. (Being human, he might also want
to determine what the General actually wants to hear - but saying that
might involve not telling the truth as the IA knows it/determines it to
be.) Then, he determines the resources available to him to supply the
information which can paint the picture. If he's lucky, he gets to task
these resources to gather items or information the IA thinks are either
necessary or useful to fill in the picture. This list is generally called
the Essential Elements of Intelligence (EEI). A priority system is
incorporated in the drafting of the EEI because no one, not even Mr Gates
himself, can afford, or has available to him, all the information in the
world. So, the IA tasks his resources to gather the information according
to this priority list. For instance, getting information on the daily
whereabouts of the enemy General can be priority 1 while the location of
his mistress on a daily basis is pri 1000, but on a monthly basis her
location might be pri 50. Then again, the location of the HQ, 4th Guards
Tank Army on a daily basis might never drop below pri 10 for the commander
of NATO forces in Europe. A future post may delineate the EEI in great
detail.
After tasking his resources, the IA waits for the information to come in.
As it starts coming in, he begins a cycle of evaluating the ability
"produce" of each intelligence data source with regard to specific types
of information and the timeliness of that information against that of
other intelligence sources. For example, source A may be able to produce
10,000 data items daily in a specific area but zero in any other area. Of
those 10,000 items, however, only 1,000 might be verifiable with any other
data source. Of that 1,000, maybe 500 might fit in with 90 percent
accruacy with what other sources are reporting while the remaining 10
percent might fit in with some "massaging". So, what about the other
9,000 items? Well, the IA may have to consider that no other source may
be able to report on those items (ex., this source is a satellite system
providing the only coverage on Apra Harbor, Guam), or the measurement
accuracy of the source may not be matched by any other source. Then
again, the reporting of the source may not be "time-coincident" with data
from other sources. The dedicated IA has to establish a "norm" for each
of his sources in order to work efficiently and effectively.
So, let's stop an minute and look at a single point in time.
Source Info Accuracy
Timeliness
A-Human Pol figure loc 95%
Daily
75%
Within 2 hours
1%
Minute by minute
Technology (air general) 10%
Daily
B-Human Pol figure loc 50%
Daily
50%
Within 2 hours
.1%
Minute by minute
Techology (air general) 90%
Monthly
(air specific) 25%
Weekly
C-Listening Post Techology (air general) 0%
Air operations by enemy 15%
Minute by minute
Movement of mil figure 5%
24 hour late rptg
D-Overhead Troop movements (Asia) 0%
(Italy) 5%
Minute by minute
(Central Europe) 75%
Minute by minute
(Scandinavia) 50%
Minute by minute
(Iceland) 5%
Minute by minute
From the above example we can see that some resources just plain should
not be tasked with obtaining informationin certain areas because they
simply do not have the accuracy required to be useful. It should also be
considered tho' that a particular source might be able to accurately
report, in a les timely fashion, on things that other sources might report
on more frequently but less accurately. So, a daily picture put together
by the IA (without considering yesterday's picture) could be made more
accruate by including the time-late reporting of a particular source AND
incorporating yesterday's picture.
The IA also needs to inject reality into his picture. For instance, it is
almost unheard of for a straight-leg infantry unit to move over 100 miles
in one day. BUT, with unit having a starting location of airport, and
with the colocation there of an airlift capable/air transport unit, the
infanty guys COULD easily be here today and there tomorrow. However, from
a naval perspective, a carrier can only mmove so fast - so even if clouds
prevent satellite location on a particular day, one could draw a circle on
a map centered on the last known location and have the radius of the
circle equal to the maximum speed of the carrier (plus an insurance
factor) times the number of hours (or other units of time) since the
carrier was last located. This probability of the carrier being SOEMWHERE
within in the circle is then dependent on the accuracy of friendly
intelligence dat on the speed of the carrier. One CANNOT simply use the
observed speed of the carrier during this particular voyage! The guy may
just have been out tooli' around until he hit the clouds. This use of
clouds to disappear has been demostrated throughout naval history with
great effectiveness by navies througout the world. Technology has,
however, limited the amount of time that this tactic can gain the carrier.
Sooner or later the ship has to come out from under the clouds and when
he does, he's vulnerable again to overhead surveillance. The overhead
assets can be tasked (and steered) to the area over the "lost circle" and
they can remain there looking for the carrier as long as necessary. Of
course, the circle's area/that is, the area of ocean that the IA must look
in, increases the longer the carrier goes unlocated. Clouds are not the
only thing that could delay relocating the carrier; try a lack of trained
photgraphic interpreters to process the raw photograohic data for the
fusion IA. While pictures are worth a thousand words to most people,
specks on the ocean may be meaningless to untrained eyes.
Part 6.B
Then again the Intelligence Analyst (IA) may have to retask his satellites
to cover specific ports if the carrier is not in an open ocean area.
Carriers may attempt to "hide" in plain sight by sailing with a group of
ships. This is usually not successful, at least not for a long period of
time. Size is against the carrier.
But, take the case of a smaller, harder to pictorially identify unit - say
one of the fast frigates usually comprising the screening force for the
carrier. Looking at consecutive pictures of a battle group, a photgraphic
interpreter may realize (by simple counting) that a frigate is missing
from the lastest picture of the battlegroup, but he may not be able to
identify which one for any of a variety of reasons (poor photo quality,
ships of the same class sailing in the battlegroup).
Where the "lost frigate is" is a question the IA must weigh against the
number of available assets he has that he can retask to look for the
missing "small boy". Maybe one missing frigate doesn't worry the IA; so,
he doesn't look for the frigate. Maybe the IA worries that the frigate
has been sent off on a recon mission of its own or the IA has other
reporting suggesting that the frigate has a special mission to transport a
special warfare unit onto a remote island (but he doesn't know which
island). The IA might retask a number of satellite (or other) assets to
find the ship figuring that a large battlegroup should be able to be
easily much more located than a single ship.
So, the IA modifies his Essential Elements of Information (EEI) list
constantly according to the timeliness and accracy of intelligence
reporting he has received as the battle has progressed. As the EEI's are
satisifed or collected, resources are constantly retasked, assigned new
mission goals, sometimes repositioned , and often retrained or reequipped.
IA's have to be selective about the distribution of information back down
to his resources/collectors because he needs to preserve the purity of his
sources. But, if he discovers that a source is being consistently duped
or misled, or is repeatedly reporting something that is known to be false,
the IA has a few choices.
He can inform the source that his information is not accurate (and what
the real information is), or that other sources are reporting something
diferent, or he can keep the source ignorant of the difference between his
reporting and that of other sources. Or, the IA may decide that this
misinformation may be useful to be leaked as a "Disinformation" leak for
the enemy to stumble upon in his own intelligence gathering. The IA may
recall the intelligence collector and retrain him, reequip him, relocate
him if there is suspicion that his intelligence collection efforts have
been compromised by being discovered by the enemy (leading to being fed
disinformation).
In any event, its a never-ending cycle. Collect, evaluate each piece
individualy, evaluate all pieces collectively, identify the pieces which
do fit together, identify the pieces which do not fit with the majority of
other pieces, analyze (brainstorm) why those non-fitting pieces are being
reported and attempt to figure out how to fit them in with "minor routine
adjustments" (like "add .5MHZ to every one of this guy's frequency reports
and he fits in with all the rest of our source reports" if you can't get
the fellow to recalibrate his equipment), throw out reports from sources
which are known to be routinely inaccurate, compare the picture you
discover today with yesterday's picture, compare it with last week's
picture, see if any major changes have occured which you did not predict,
see if any previously thought to be minor changes are actually major
changes or if minor changes could have major effects, then report your
findings.
Part 6.C.
What IF'ing and the Intelligence Analyst (IA)
One of the most important roles of the IA is to attempt to predict what
the enemy intentions are by analyzing what his capabilities are given his
current situation. Up until now we have discussed gathering data in order
to establish "the situation as the IA sees it". Now he gets to take on
the role of reader of the crystal ball.
In this endeavor, the IA must gather all the details of enemy equipment,
tactics, command personalities and tendencies, the friendly force
situation/location and what is known about what the enemy believes the
friendly force situation to be. By piecing all these things together, a
"potentials" list of options for the enemy General can be drawn up and the
IA must then assign probabilites weightings to these potentialities. What
the IA does is to place himself in the enemy General's shoes and says
"Given this situation, given this set of goals, what would I do from here
to increase my chances of attaining those goals?". The IA playing enemy
General often brainstorms things which "no intelligent commander in his
right mind" would try but the IA does this to establish a worst case
scenario for his own (friendly) forces. (Ex., wargaming a scenario where
all enemy aircraft are sent into one sector at one time for a bombing
mission).
What the IA is after is attempting to identify the goals/motivations of
the enemy forces - at the force, unit, and individual commander level.
Some commanders are more concerned with ground gains than with losses of
personnel, other commanders husband their forces greedily immediately
before an attack (and thus "foretell" the IA of intentions), some
commanders have a preferred formation contrary to the general rule for the
enemy. An infantry unit may have recently been assigned a unit t has
never been given before and therefore be ineffecective or at least less
effective than other units - this might be determined by an IA observing a
unit trasnferring from one organizational HQ to the control of another.
That observation could have been detected/theorized due to interrogations
of captured soldiers or by intercepting communications between the unit
and an unknown entity it has never communicated with before. If a unit is
observed moving in road march formation directly toward a resupply point
in his own area, he may be "topping off" his fuel tanks and ammo just
before launching an assault, or he may be getting ready to make an
interorganization transfer with a move to another area of the battlefield.
A unit road marching at high speed down a highway parallel to the Forward
Edge of the Battle Area (battle line) (FEBA) can be ordered to turn toward
the battle line and engage or plug a hole. He cold be diverted from an
assigned mission in this manner in order to take advantage of a developing
situation as the Friendly General sees it, or he could be responding to a
successful attack by enemy forces and just be fortuitously at the right
place at the right time.
Change of topic//backing up
At a lower level, intelligence analysis can determining the location of a
unit/units. One technique involves plotting the reports from different
sources on a map. The hoped-for result is triangulation.
A
\
- \ -
- \ -
-C -
- \ -
B- \ - D
Collectors A, B and D report something on various bearings (Pt C). The IA
will plot these points and include a judicious margin for error oneach
plot. The resulting point of intersection or the triangle resulting from
plotting these lines provides a probable area of location for some unit
being in/around Pt C.
With only two collectors, triangulation is not possible - obviously. So,
a two point plot is inherently less accurate than a three point plot.
With only one collector, you might think that you can only get a line of
bearing - there's something out there, on such and such a bearing. But,
that isn't always true. If the collector is an aircraft, the collector is
actually moving to different locations. If the aircraft moves fast
enough, a number of time-different reports could be generated and plotted
resulting in the desired "triangulation".
A\
A \
A \/
A----/----------------------------
A / \
A /
A/
Cute, huh?
Part 7.A Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
This part discusses the things the Intelligence Analyst (IA) searches for
and uses in order to assemble an accurate "picture" of the battlefield.
1. Geography
A. Terrain
1) Key features
a) Major bodies of water
b) Major regions of mountainous terrain
c) Major regions of desert
d) Regions providing classic tank battle terrain - flat, open, unimpeded
2) Major obstacles to movement
a) Rivers
b) Swamps/marsh
c) Mountains without passes/hardtop roads
3) Locations of allied territories
a) Neighbors
b) Distant allies
4) Locations of traditionally enemy territories
a) Neighbors
b) Distant allies
5) Political Borders
B. Ocean/Water Features
1) Friendly Ports
a) Own Ports
I) Water Depth/Maximum size of Ship which can use Port
II) Repair Facilities
III) Resupply Facilities
IV) Defenses
V) Communication Facilities
VI) Colocated non-naval Facilites/Units
VII) Early Warning Facilities - Radar, Sonar, Other
VIII) Number of Berths - Deep Water and Not so deep Water
b) Allied Ports
see Friendly Ports description above
c) Neutral Ports
see Friendly Ports above
Also determine the conditions under which any Friendly or Enemy unit can
use the Port. Is it open to all with no restrictions, or is it available
for emergency services but then the unit may not leave (as was the case in
the South Western Atlantic during WWII)?
2) Distances
a) Between Friendly Ports
b) Between Friendly and Enemy Ports
c) Between Friendly and Neutral Ports
3) Shipyards
a) Location
b) New Construction or Repair
c) Experience with regard to all classes of enemy ships
d) Drydock Facilities
e) Berths
f) Special Techonlogy Facilities (ex., able to handle nuclear weapons,
nuclear reactors, etc.)
g) Availability of Rescue Vessels
h) Quality and Size of Workforce
I) Number of (World) Renown Experts
II) Number of Trained Technicians
III) Quality of Technical Workforce
4) Water Depths
a) Shallows
I) Location
II) Depth(s)
III) Key underwater features
IV) Anomalies associated with this shallow
b) Deep Water Areas
see Shallows above
5) Anomalies
a) Magnetic
1) Location
2) Description of effect
b) Acoustic
see Magnetic anomalies above
c) Weather
see Magnetic anomalies above
d) Electromagnetic (Radio)
see Magnetic anomalies above
Part 7.B.1 Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
2. Command Organization and Personalities
A. Command Structure/Organization(s)
Personalities
(what we are going for here is a picture of "the whole person" - how he
may act based upon his experience, training, previous successes as well as
failures, how well he supports/endorses national level tactics/strategies,
etc.)
a) Commanding General
I) Formal Training
II) Important Training Exercises
III) Prior National Commands
IV) Prior Combat Experience
V) Prior International Commands
VI) Experience in Staff Positions
VII) Key Political Alliances
VIII) Military Mentors
IX) Length of Time in Current Position
X) Family size, location, general (and specific background(s))
b) Chief of Staff
(as with CG)
c) Major Subordinate Commander
(as with CG/CoS)
1) Command Structure
a) Generic Oranization
National Command Authority
Service (Ground Force) Service(Naval)
Service (Air Force)
Theater (See appropriate
section for these orgs)
Army
Corps
Division Regiment
Brigade Brigade
Battalion Battalion
Company Team
Platoon Company/Platoon
Squad Platoon/Squad
Soldier Soldier
1) Services
A} Army
1} Operating Forces/Combat Forces
a} Infantry
b} Tank
c} Mechanized Infantry
d} Artillery/Rocket Forces (Non-Strategic)
e} Airborne (if not subordinated elsewhere)
f} Chemical Forces
g} Air Defense
2} Combat Support
a} Intelligence (Directorate)
b} Logistics (supply and transport)
c} Communications (strategic/tactical)
d} Engineer (bridging and construction)
3} Combat Service Support
a} Maintenance
b} Medical
c} Personnel Support Services (pay, records, historical, POW internment)
d} Police
e} Traffic control (road movement scheduling if not poice controlled)
4} Weapons [need info on all charateristics of [ ex., rate of fire,
range, size of projectile, number of personnel required to operate, speed
of vehicle, range of vehicle on full fuel tank at combat speed/at road
movement speed, etc.])
a} Tanks (warhead types, man/autmoated loader, how many rounds are
normally carried on board, etc.)
b} Armored Personnel Carriers/Reconnaisance Vehicles (number of troops
carried, on board weaponry/radios, etc.)
c} Wheeled Combat Vehicles (Jeeps, Anti-tank, Machine gun carriers,
command vehicles, etc.) [field of vision when "closed up", points of
vulnerability vis a vis "our" weapons, communications (radios and
internal), sensors (infrared/light), etc.)
d} Anti-aircraft weapons (guns, missiles, rockets - both man-packed and
vehicular)
(speed of missile, control method, target detection method, how are
multiple missiles controlled/coordinated, target selection
criteria/methodology, etc.)
e} Personnel Weapons (rifles, machine guns, pistols, grenades, etc.)
[how effective is each weapon, accuracy, rate of fire, weight, reliability
in adverse conditions, etc.)
f} Mines (anti-personnel [claymores, bouncing betty's), anti-vehicular
[anti-tank, anti-truck]) (construction, explosive material, quantity of
explosive, what sets each off, penetration qualities, fragmentation
details, countermeasures, etc.)
g} Anti-tank (rockets, missiles, recoilles rifles, etc.)
(range, rate of fire, penetration ability against various armors,
defensive tactics which are effective against each - electronic
jamming/smoke screen?, etc.)
h} Artillery (howitzers, mortars, field pieces, etc.) (range, mode of
transport, crew size, types/sizes of projectiles, rate of fire, etc.)
h} Army subordinated aircraft (fixed, rotary wing) [speed, range,
weapons, sensors, method of control, tactics, etc.]
5} Support Equipment
a} Engineering Equipment (bridging, trenching, mine laying, etc.)
(treat as a vehicular weapon - speed, range, etc.)
b} Communications Equipment [radios, radio-teletype, satcom, signal,
flares]
(need frequencies, modulation types, power output, antenna types, etc.)
c} Specialized Vehichles (ex., ChemBioNuc detectors, Medical transports,
Refueling Vehicles, Rescue Vehicles, Troop Transports, etc.)
Ref: Includes Illustrated Directory of Modern Soviet Weapons, ARCO, 1986
Part 7.B.2 Essential Elements of Information
B} Naval
a} Organization
Operational
Service
Admiral of the Fleet(s)
Fleet Admiral/Theater Commander
Task Force Commander (Eskadra/Flotillas)
Battlegroup Commander (Ship Brigade)
Group/Type Commander
Squadron Commander
Ship Commander
Note: Some Shore Facilities Commanders share roughly the same status as
the shipboard counterparts but, these assignments can lack in "prestige"
at the lower levels and are generally not sought after because of that.
Administrative may include such titles as:
- Air Wing Commander
- Sub Commander (Ashore)
- ASW Commander (Ashore)
- Shore Facilities Commands
- Training School Cmmands
1} Ship Types
I} Carriers (below are listed the PRIMARY type of aircraft a particular
carrier class may be designed to carry - or the primary mission of the
carrier)
n Fixed wing
n Short takeoff/landing aircraft
n Rotary wing aircraft
n Training
n Amhibious Support Combat Command/Communication Center
II} Cruisers/Battle Cruisers (Primary weapon system/Missions)
[Battleships are no longer in modern naval inventories, but generally had
a mission of providing area control, power projection (until post-Vietnam,
conventional gun rounds on targets; Iowa, Missouri were cruise missile
launch platforms) and can generally be thought of as large (battle)
cruisers with bigger guns (I know, men and phallic symbols, hahahaha)]
n Conventional guns
n Missile launch platforms
n Area Control (usually anti-air, can be anti-ship)
III} Destroyers (Primary weapon system/Mission)
n Conventional guns
n Missile launch platforms
n Anit-Air/Anti-Missile
n Anti-Ship (Missile)
n Anti-Submarine
IV} Frigates (Primary weapon system/Mission)
n Conventional guns
n Missile launch platforms
n Anti-Submarine
n Anti-Ship
V} Amphibious Warfare Ships
n Large, multi-weapon, multi-function command ships
n Helicopter/Landing Ship
n Tank Landing Ships
n Medium Landing Ships
n Utility Landing Ships
n Landing Craft (including some air cushion vehicles)
VI} Smaller than Frigates/Support Vessels (Type names/Missions)
n Hyrdocraft
n Assault craft
n Intelligence Collectors
n Missile Range Instrumentation Ships
n Minesweepers/Minelayers
n Conventional Goods/Resupply Ships
n Oilers
n Fresh Water Carriers (for consumption and for use in boilers)
n Transport (Troops, conventional weapons, missiles)
n Cargo Carrier
n Tugs
n Hospital Ships
n Salvage/Rescue Ships
n Missile/Torpedo Launch Platforms
n Radar Pickets
n Riverine Gunboats
n Submarine Support Ships
n Repair Ships
n Heavy Lift Ships (used to transport damaged ships)
n Floating Drydocks
n Cable laying ships (for communicatons cables)
n Refrigeration Ships
n Training Ships (sailed and conventional power)
n Power Generation Ships
n Degaussing/deperming Ships
n Noise measurement Ships
n Icebreakers
n Fire-fighting Ships
n Torpedo Retrievers
n Target Control Ships/Boats
n Diving Support Ships
n Target Craft/barges (radar reflectors)
n Oceanographic research/hydrographic survey Ships
n Space Event Support Ships (support upper atmosphere and space research)
VI} Submarines (Primary Missions)
n Anti-Submarine/Attack
n Ballistic Missile
n Radar Picket
n Test Platform
n Coastal Patrol
n Cruise Missile
b} Training
c} Support
d} Personnel
Missions Summary (combat only/not auxiliary or support ships)
Strategic level missions
Defense of the Homeland
Strategic Attack/Pre-emptive strike
Sea Control - coastal/open water
Force or Power Projection/Support to 3rd World Countries
Rapid Reaction/Forward Deployment
Coastal Defense
Tactical level missions (for ships and groups of ships)
Anti-Carrier
Anti-surface warfare
Anti-air/missile warfare
Anti-submarine warfare
Amphibious Warfare
Screening Force
Conventional Gunnery
Shore Bombardment
Missile launch platform (cruise, ballistic, area/self-defense)
Command, Communications, Control
Coastal Defense
Nuclear Warfare
Chemical Warfare
Electronic Warfare
Intelligence and Surveillance
Strategic Reserve
Ref: Includes Guide to the Soviet Navy, 4th Ed, Norman Polmar
The Shhips and Aircraft of the US Fleet, 14th Ed.
8. Analyzing Actions by military units
A. After collection of various amounts of raw data, from various sources,
the IA must "fuse" it. Fusion is the process of evaluating each bit of
raw data while keeping in mind both the limitations of individual
collectors and the collective picture that all collectors/reporting
sites/agents are painting.
Take for example, the situation where 4 radio interceptors are
collecting against an infantry force, 2 mechanized infantry vehicles are
conducting reconnaissance patrols, we have managed to capture some enemy
soldiers, and we have some captured/found abandoned documents.
The radio interceptors can (and do) tell us that approximately 32
"stations" are broadcasting; they can even tell us who talks to whom, when
and how much. They can even begin (after a while) to follow individual
voices from network to network and frequency to frequency. Using simple
techniques, they can locate the lines of bearing from their (friendly)
locations to the point of greatest signal strength (the probable
location(S) of the enemy transmitters). By plotting this information in
various ways, we can track movements by indvidual transmitters and the
enemy force as a whole without ever having visually spotted it. But,
people lie.
The mech infantry recon vehicles are acting as our eyes. By
coordinating their patrol with the information from the radio
interceptors, our IA has directed the patrol to locations where visual
observations of the enemy transmitters may be made. The recon patrol
reports on unit size, markings on vehicles/shoulder patches, vehicle
types, number of infantry observed, driection/speed of movement of enemy
units/personnel, etc. Merging this raw data with that from "intermediate"
analysis of the radio interceptors' data (translations of the enemy reveal
certain order given by specific transmitters and other transmitters
responding by moving as directed by the first transmitter) we begin to
develop a preliminary picture of the organizational structure of the enemy
unit facing us.
One of the enemy soldiers we have captured has a shoulder patch similar
to that reported by the recon patrol. We direct our interrogation efforts
toward gaining information about the intent of the enemy force, its
command and control procedures and its relationshhip with higher
headquarters. WE are effective (use torture if you choose - I was just
good vice abusive) and learn that the soldiers' believe that the intent of
the enemy unit is to take a bridge we hold. I say they believe that
because, as I mentioned before - people lie. Officers don't necessarily
reveal their true intentions to their men - any move on the bridge might
be just a diversion instead of a serious attempt to take the bridge.
(Sketicism or a somewhat jaundiced eye are useful tools for IA's).
Another soldier's story (this guy doesn't have the same shoulder patch)
tells a slightly different story - supporting the diversion theory. From
a third soldier, assigned to a fuel transport unit he claims, describes
nearly empty fuel trucks being ordered to move parallel to the front lines
without refueling themselves any more than necessary. This too supports
the diversion theory.
The documents are maps and copies (burned but still readable through
surface charring) of orders detailing the assault on the bridge. There
are a number of arrows drawn on the maps which show routes of march and
axis of attack on the bridge. Other documents show frequencies for
artillery support, code-words and callsigns. Though some of the documents
are marked classified, the situation in which the documents were found
(included in the report submitted by the friendly force finding the
documents) or captured (especially if the douments were hidden on captured
soldiers) a good IA uses that jaundiced eye and doesn't take anything for
granted. Map analysis of the region surrounding the bridge in question
identifies our forward area fuel resupply point as being within 1.5
kilometers of the bridge - not a huge stretch in the mechanized vehicles
the enemy is tooling around in.
Back to the patrol, over the last two hours they have observed six tanks
moving in the direction of the bridge - where earlier none of our
front-line troops had reported recent contact with any tanks. We ask the
radio interceptors if they have noticed any tank specific radio traffic
and BINGO, those boys have been talking about the having to turn at an
intersection past the bridge - coincidently, the intersection just HAPPENS
to be within 1 mile of our fuel point.
We report this developing picture to our Commander('s staff) along with
the possible interpretations of the raw data. Unless pinned down, we let
the Commander decide what the enemy intention is - no use putting our
heads in the noose just yet - and go back to collecting and analyzing more
data. New reports of enemy sightings come in from non-intelligence
related friendly units - these reports refine the location, size, rate of
march and formation of the enemy force. AS the picture becomes
incontrovertible, we report back to the CO that the enemy passed the
bridge and our conclusion is that he's going for the fuel point.
The CO smiles as he tells us that after our first briefing to him, he'd
taken the prudent precaution of moving the fuel point to another location
- but left a couple of empty trucks ther as decoys/bait. Instead, the
enemy will find three of our friendly tanks and 2 anti-tank missle crews
hidden in ambush in the treeline surrounding the now-abandoned fuel point.
THAT is how military intelligence works at its best. Collect, analyze,
collect some more, re-analyze, report, collect some more.. .. .. .. A
circle to be sure, but very rewarding !!!!
Note: I may return to the EEI of section/Part 7 later, but it grew
tedious... If anyone else wishes to contribute, please do....
DrmWeaver2 aka John Martin (in my other life)
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* Dreams are what the world revolves around. *
* If it weren't for Dreams *
* there would be no computers, *
* and we'd be discussing something else. *
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